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HOPE DIES LAST: THE PROGRESSIVE POTENTIAL AND
REGRESSIVE REALITY OF THE ANTIBALKANIZATION
APPROACH TO RACIAL EQUALITY
David Simson*

This Article relies on Critical Race Theory concepts and social science research
to make an important and timely contribution to a debate in law and public policy
that is both long-standing and of immense current importance: What is the relationship between social cohesion on the one hand, and racial equality progress on the
other? Events over the last two years have put this question into sharp relief. On the
one hand, portions of the general public and at least some policymakers have signaled
support for the demands of racial justice activists to reduce and eliminate systemic
racism after too many tragedies of police brutality against the Black community
have made painfully obvious that such systemic racism continues.1 At the same time,
the country is perhaps more politically divided than ever before, the racial dimensions of this division are evident, and events since the 2020 election have shown that
appetite for racial reform is by no means universal. In this environment, calls to
“unify” and take time to “heal” as well as to “root out systemic racism” are made at
the same time. Can these calls be realistically pursued at the same time or is there
a need to prioritize one over the other? This is not just a question of policy but also of
constitutional law. Over the last four decades, the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence on governmental race-consciousness has answered with an “antibalkanization approach” which prioritizes social cohesion. Indeed, this approach views
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social cohesion as a prerequisite for racial equality progress. It considers racial
hostility and resentment among White Americans as the most important racial equality
obstacle and polices governmental race-consciousness in an attempt to minimize
such hostility and resentment. It believes that this is the only way to reach the constitutional ideal of racial equality. Many policymakers in the past have agreed. This
Article posits that while this approach appears to be well-meaning and cares about
some of the right kinds of considerations, it is ultimately flawed because it misunderstands the dynamics of racial inequality and racial hierarchy. The antibalkanization
approach attempts to solve a structural problem with a “bad apple” approach—what
Critical Race Theory scholars have called a perpetrator perspective. This Article
goes in depth to illustrate both the inner workings of the antibalkanization approach
and how social science research on the sociological and social psychological dimensions of racial hierarchy shows it to be flawed. The approach ought to be replaced
by a more accurate model of racial equality progress that would view White racial
hostility and resentment not as an obstacle but as a likely inevitable side effect of the
path of structural change that is necessary for achieving both racial equality and
social cohesion over the long term. Adopting such a structural understanding of racial
hostility and resentment would have important implications for both policymakers
and for the Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Events over the last two years have put the following into sharp relief: (1) Americans are polarized and divided over what is right and wrong, and they view members
of “the other side” with hostility;2 and (2) race remains a major factor in those divisions and hostilities,3 and racism and racial inequality fail to abate.4 Unsurprisingly,
2

See, e.g., Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His PostElection Conduct, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics
/2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-marks-for-his-post-election
-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/F95R-MMDN]; Partisan Antipathy: More Intense, More Personal,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/10/partisan
-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/ [https://perma.cc/N5LN-H5UQ].
3
To name just two of the most visible manifestations: first, the outwardly racialized
nature of the 2020 presidential election campaign suggests that the Republican Party and
Donald Trump believe that racist appeals will be rewarded by large numbers of (mostly White)
Americans at the polls. See, e.g., John Fritze, David Jackson & Michael Collins, Critics Slam
Trump ‘Suburban Housewife’ Tweet as Racist, Sexist ‘Dog Scream’ Play for White Voters,
USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2020, 3:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elec
tions/2020/08/12/trump-critics-see-tweet-the-suburban-housewife-sexist-racist/3348444001/
[https://perma.cc/VC2U-RKW3]. Second, the continuity of significant racial polarization in
actual voting for Democrats versus Republicans as suggested by exit polls after the November
election suggests that Republicans are at least partially right. National Results 2020 President
Exit Polls, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results
[https://perma.cc/F9P6-G323] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (reporting that 87% of Black voters,
65% of Latinx voters, and 61% of Asian American voters supported Biden, but only 41% of
White voters). As Ian Haney López has explained, coded racial appeals to White voters have
formed the backbone of Republican electoral strategy since the 1960s. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ,
DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 18 (2014). Second, racial resentments also appear to have
played an important role in the storming of the Capitol by supporters of President Trump on
January 6, 2020. See Thomas B. Edsall, White Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www
.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/opinion/capitol-riot-White-grievance.html [https://perma.cc/PRS4
-NGXN]. Third, the ongoing agitation against (inaccurate portrayals of so-called) “Critical
Race Theory” ideas that originated in the former Trump administration’s Executive Order on
Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping and has since inspired copycat legislation at the state
level illustrates deep divisions over whether racial inequality persists, what its roots are, and
whether it should even be discussed in educational programs, corporate trainings, and elsewhere.
For an analysis of anti–Critical Race Theory state legislation, see, e.g., African American Policy
Forum, Welcome to the #TruthBeTold Campaign, AAPF—THE AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY
FORUM, https://www.aapf.org/truthbetold (last visited Mar. 28, 2022). For an example of the
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then, in his speech after his election victory president-elect Joe Biden spoke about
the need to address both issues and suggested that his administration would pursue
the following solutions: As to (1) seek “not to divide but unify” by “put[ting] away
the harsh rhetoric, lower[ing] the temperature,” and finding “time to heal”;5 and (2)
wage a “battle to achieve racial justice and root out systemic racism.”6 He has
repeated similar themes in various contexts since then.7
acrimony involved in some of these debates, see, e.g., Nicquel Terry Ellis & Boris Sanchez,
Turmoil Erupts in School District After Claims that Critical Race Theory and Transgender
Policy Are Being Pushed, CNN (June 24, 2021, 5:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06
/24/us/loudoun-county-school-board-meeting/index.html [https://perma.cc/E99W-JPEL].
4
While there are many ways to make this point, two illustrations were particularly
prominent in 2020: First, seemingly never-ending police brutality against Black Americans.
See, e.g., Osagie K. Obasogie, Police Killing Black People Is a Pandemic, Too, WASH. POST
(June 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/police-violence-pandemic/2020
/06/05/e1a2a1b0-a669-11ea-b619-3f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/9TUR-6H5D].
Second, racialized health care, economic, and other social disparities have exposed communities of color to disproportionate harm and suffering as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.
Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, CDC (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov
/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/ME55-JLEY].
5
Amber Phillips, Joe Biden’s Victory Speech, Annotated, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2020,
9:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/07/annotated-biden-victory
-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U96N-9LSK].
6
Id.
7
For example, Biden noted the apparent disparity in police treatment of protesters (many
of which were people of color) during racial justice protests over the summer of 2020 and
the mob (essentially all-White) that stormed the Capitol on January 6 and noted that this
difference in treatment was both undeniable and “totally unacceptable.” See Annie Linskey,
Chelsea Janes & Amy B. Wang, Biden Denounces Racial Inequities in Blasting Capitol Riot,
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 8:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-racial
-inequity-capitol-mob/2021/01/07/07d5961e-5112-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/RMD2-6CQT]. But he has also separately reiterated his “overarching objective . . . to unify this country.” Joe Biden Introduces Economics & Labor Nominees Speech
Transcript, REV (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/joe-biden-introduces
-economics-labor-nominees-speech-transcript [https://perma.cc/8QD4-7FL9]. More recently,
Biden has criticized new voting restrictions that have been passed by Republican-led state
legislatures and often predominantly burden voters of color as a type of “[twenty-fir]st century Jim Crow assault” that his administration would challenge. See Remarks by President
Biden on Protecting the Sacred, Constitutional Right to Vote, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 13,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/13/remarks
-by-president-biden-on-protecting-the-sacred-constitutional-right-to-vote/ [https://perma.cc
/7DVD-S6SJ]. At the same time, Biden has explained that his objections to eliminating the
Senate filibuster to pass broad federal voting rights legislation are partially grounded in the
belief that such a strategy would be inconsistent with his objective of “trying to bring the
country together.” Chris Cillizza, Joe Biden (Still) Doesn’t Want to Get Rid of the Filibuster,
CNN (July 22, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/22/politics/biden-filibuster
-senate/index.html [https://perma.cc/AN2F-E8D6].

2022]

HOPE DIES LAST

617

Both goals—(1) avoiding division, conflict, and hostility, and (2) remedying
systemic racism—seem eminently reasonable and important, especially in the current
climate. But are they necessarily compatible? Or may pursuing one goal potentially
clash with, and perhaps require limits on, the pursuit of the other?8 If the goals clash,
choices about which goal to prioritize will have to be made. Racial justice activists
have demanded loudly and clearly that systemic change toward racial justice must
finally be prioritized.9 In various ways, Biden has signaled that he is sympathetic to
such demands.10 However, history suggests that the perceived need for avoiding or
curing disagreements among White Americans is usually prioritized over stated
commitments to eradicating systemic racism when they clash.11 Will America’s
8

See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 3, at 31–32, 198–204 (describing the “backlash”
theory popular among Democratic Party establishment since at least the 1990s which suggests that if government “push[es] too fast with civil rights and the extension of liberal
programs . . . a hostile eruption ineluctably follows” and thus counsels against decisive civil
rights intervention, as well as similar views adopted under the banner of “post-racialism”
during the Obama administration).
9
See, e.g., The Movement for Black Lives, Vision for Black Lives, M4BL, https://m4bl
.org/policy-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/3YPK-REQH] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (“In recent
years, we have taken to the streets, launched massive campaigns, and impacted elections, but
our elected leaders have failed to address the legitimate demands of our Movement. We can
no longer wait.”).
10
For example, in his post-election victory speech, Biden explicitly recognized that overwhelming support from those most harmed by racial inequality, the Black community was
indispensable to his election and called for reciprocal support from him: “[T]he African
American community stood up again for me. You’ve always had my back, and I’ll have yours.”
Phillips, supra note 5. Biden also signed an executive order titled “Advancing Racial Equity
and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government” that specifically
notes “the unbearable human costs of systemic racism” and calls on all agencies across the
federal government to assess whether their policies impose systemic barriers for people of
color and other underserved groups and to address those barriers. See Exec. Order 13985, 86
F.R. 7009 (2021).
11
Famously, Derrick Bell proposed that in American society a “principle of ‘interest
convergence’” is at work according to which “[t]he interests of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.” Derrick
A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). At least in part because of this fact, some in the Black community remain skeptical of Biden’s asserted commitments to rooting out systemic racism until tangible
proof is provided. See, e.g., John Eligon & Audra D.S. Burch, Black Voters Helped Deliver
Biden a Presidential Victory. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/11/11/us/joe-biden-black-voters.html [https://perma.cc/S68C-24Y9]. Because of
the stalling or scaling back of various racial justice proposals ranging from voting to infrastructure to police reform, some of this skepticism continues. See, e.g., Lauren Gambino,
Biden Vowed to Make Racial Justice the Heart of His Agenda—Is It Still Beating?, THE
GUARDIAN (Sep. 8, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/08/joe-biden
-racial-justice-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/GVD9-F6WG].
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checkered racial justice history continue to repeat itself12 as some signs seem to be
indicating,13 or will things be different this time?
This Article argues that close evaluation of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
racial equality jurisprudence of the last four decades offers important lessons that
need to be learned and implemented—both by policymakers and by the Court
itself—for things to be different this time. This jurisprudence has revolved precisely
around the relationship between avoiding social division and conflict on the one
hand, and eradicating America’s legacy of racism on the other. Specifically, an
“antibalkanization” approach14 has driven the Court’s doctrinal answers15 to perhaps
12

See Devon W. Carbado, Afterword, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593,
1607–08 (2011) (describing “reform/retrenchment dialectic” in the history of American race
relations).
13
See, e.g., Gambino, supra note 11.
14
That this approach exists and is a separate approach to race-related equal protection
cases from the traditionally recognized “anticlassification” and “antisubordination” approaches
was first proposed by Reva Siegel in 2011. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278
(2011); see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2003) (describing the
relationship between traditionally recognized approaches). Recognition of the antibalkanization
approach was an important development in equal protection scholarship because it can help
better explain certain features of current doctrine. For example, despite the assertiveness of
claims to colorblindness and anticlassification in the opinions of many conservative Justices,
certain types of affirmative action programs in higher education that explicitly rely on race
as well as the practice of race-conscious redistricting remain constitutionally permissible.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (affirmative action in
higher education); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (redistricting); see also Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 812 (2006) (“Colorblindness
is not a reasonable interpretation of the case law because it collapses the context-sensitive
continuum defined by the Court’s decisions.”). At the same time, and inconsistent with an
antisubordination approach, the Supreme Court has made clear that all governmental uses
of race, no matter who is benefitted or harmed by them, are subject to the most stringent
judicial review in the form of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 224 (1995). While some have proposed that these doctrinal features may simply reflect
compromise between anticlassification and antisubordination in certain cases, others have
argued that they are better explained by the existence of a freestanding antibalkanization
approach. Compare, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory,
93 TEX. L. REV. 415, 417 (2014) (suggesting that “antibalkanization may be best understood
as a pragmatic set of ad hoc compromises between anticlassification and antisubordination,
rather than a theory on which to build antidiscrimination law”), with Derrick Darby & Richard
E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 484 (2016) (“[T]he pragmatism
reflected in race moderates is a principled normative commitment to social cohesion, not
merely a strategic one of negotiating a middle path between conservatives and progressives.”).
I agree that antibalkanization is a freestanding approach and that in-depth analysis of its features
holds critical insights for how to best accomplish the Constitution’s promise of racial equality.
15
While historically only a small number of Justices have used this approach, it is fair
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the most controversial question of constitutional racial equality law: Are government
actors permitted to rely on race as a factor when deciding how to distribute resources
and opportunities in pursuit of racial equality—for example, via affirmative action
programs, race-conscious redistricting, voluntary school desegregation programs,
and the like—and if so, to what extent?16 The antibalkanization approach’s answer
is an ambivalent “sometimes” and when the answer is yes versus no is fundamentally based on its proponents’ views about the relationship between racial conflict
and racial equality progress.
Broadly speaking, the approach is built on the tension between its acknowledgment that racial inequality is a continuing problem that representative government
should be empowered to address,17 and its conviction that “social cohesion is a prerequisite for equality.”18 In resolving this tension, the approach holds that the goals
of avoiding racial conflict and eradicating racial inequality are not only compatible,
but that achieving the goal of eradicating racial inequality essentially requires avoiding
or minimizing race-based social conflict where possible.19 Because America’s history
has made race an explosive topic and racial solidarity an existing but fragile phenomenon,20 minimizing race-based social conflict, in turn, requires extremely careful
handling of governmental reliance on race as a distributive criterion: “Too much”
emphasis on race must generally be prohibited because it is too likely to create
counterproductive racial hostility and resentment, in particular among White Americans.21 More modest consideration of race that downplays its social importance, on
to say that the approach has driven the doctrinal answers of “the Court.” These Justices’
crucial position in the middle of the Court’s ideological spectrum has generally allowed them
to cast the decisive vote in the most controversial cases and to write the opinions that set out
relevant doctrine as it continues to govern. See generally infra Section I.E. For a discussion
of which Justices apply the approach, see, e.g., Blake Emerson, Affirmatively Furthering Equal
Protection: Constitutional Meaning in the Administration of Fair Housing, 65 BUFF. L. REV.
163, 199–203 (2017) (discussing Justices Kennedy and O’Connor); Siegel, supra note 14, at
1282, 1303 (identifying “race moderates” as proponents, specifically Justices Powell, O’Connor,
and Kennedy). As described below, Justice Stevens is another important proponent, though the
existing literature has so far failed to identify him as such. See infra Part III.
16
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 14, at 1302 (“[T]he antibalkanization perspective emerged
in answer to the question of whether courts would allow representative government to rectify
race inequality.”).
17
See infra Section I.A.
18
Siegel, supra note 14, at 1350.
19
See infra Section I.C.
20
See infra Section I.B.
21
For the approach’s focus on White Americans, see infra notes 44–47 and accompanying
text. In this Article, I use terms like “White,” “Black,” or “racial minority” to describe racial
group membership or broad groups of people. This should not be read to imply that there is
anything fixed or essential about such groups, or that they exist in some uncontroversially
identifiable way. Race and racial groups “exist” not as unchanging biological facts, but as
social and legal constructs that structure how people think of themselves, and how they are
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the other hand, is less likely to create racial hostility and resentment among Whites,
and therefore is sometimes permitted.22 The overarching role that the antibalkanization
approach sees for the Court is that of drawing the complex doctrinal “boundary
lines”23 that allow the government to address the ongoing problem of racial inequality while preventing the government from creating counterproductive racial conflict
and tension while doing so.24
treated by others, including the law. There is instability, change, conflict, and confusion in
how race as a construct has operated depending on contexts of time and space. See, e.g., Ian
F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (“Race is neither an essence nor an
illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro
forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions.”). But there
is also stability in that (1) race has consistently been used as a marker of social difference;
(2) racial groupings that distinguish those considered “White” from those that are not have
long been cognizable in American society; (3) these groupings have been used to construct
and defend oppressive social hierarchies built around ideas of white supremacy; and (4) these
hierarchies have consistently distributed social benefits based on perceived degrees of separation from “pure” Whiteness at the top and Blackness at the bottom. See, e.g., Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1736 (1993) (“[M]ainly whiteness
has been characterized, not by an inherent unifying characteristic, but by the exclusion of
others deemed to be ‘not white.’”). It is this stability and history that makes it meaningful to
talk about race, racial groups, race-based interests, etc., as general phenomena, while keeping
in mind that these phenomena always include exceptions, complications, and changes over
time. Thus, when I discuss research about “Whites” and the general interests and sentiments
Whites as a group tend to demonstrate in Part II, my point is not to describe any essential or
inherent characteristic or viewpoint that automatically attaches to any particular person outside of complicated social dynamics. But lack of mathematical precision does not make those
phenomena any less “real” or influential, and thus they are properly the focus of in-depth
analysis.
22
Such more modest consideration might include programs that consider race as only one
factor among many others or programs that are race-conscious but facially race-neutral. See
infra Section I.D; see also Emerson, supra note 15, at 199–203 (discussing role of salience in
the antibalkanization approach); Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Indirection, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2495,
2528–29 (2019) (discussing use of “racial indirection” in the antibalkanization perspective).
23
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (“A boundary line [. . .]
is none the worse for being narrow.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McLeod
v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944))).
24
See infra Section I.D. Since the formal recognition of the antibalkanization approach,
numerous articles have incorporated aspects of it in their analyses of doctrine in a wide range
of contexts. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, Reproductive Freedom, and the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2375 (2020) (reforms
to current practices in Assisted Reproductive Technology market); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Affirmative Action and Social Discord: Why Is Race More Controversial than Sex?, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 2305 (2019) (controversy over affirmative action in context of race versus
gender); Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017) (practice of “protected class” gatekeeping in discrimination doctrine); Darby & Levy, supra note
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Using insights from Critical Race Theory (CRT) and social science research,
this Article argues that the antibalkanization approach exhibits a “frustrating duality”25 as a strategy for achieving greater racial equality: It has progressive potential,
but, as actually implemented, it is decidedly regressive.26
The approach’s progressive potential lies in the fact that its reasoning process
incorporates many of the right considerations,27 and that it speaks to Justices who
seem to apply this reasoning process with at least somewhat of an open mind.28 The
14 (evaluation of “postracial” remedies for racial inequality); Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious
but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 653 (2015) (relationship between disparate impact liability and equal protection
doctrine); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157 (2013)
(examining disparate impact liability and equal protection doctrine); Roy G. Jr. Spece &
David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285 (2015) (strict scrutiny doctrine);
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425 (2014) (identity development of White students
as result of the Court’s diversity jurisprudence); Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences: A
Transnational Re-evaluation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 396
(Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) (use of quotas in equality interventions);
Janine Young Kim, Postracialism: Race After Exclusion, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1063
(2013) (analysis of different conceptions of race over time); Robin Charlow, Batson “Blame”
and Its Implications for Equal Protection Analysis, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1489 (2012) (peremptory
challenges of jurors on the basis of race).
25
This quote alludes to Justice Kennedy’s reference to the “frustrating duality” of the
Equal Protection Clause, but the “frustrating duality” this Article contemplates is quite
different. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument
with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. And if this is a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and
our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it.”).
26
See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 n.211 (2013) (suggesting that antibalkanization reasoning may reflect “an
instance of preservation through transformation” of existing status hierarchy); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination?: A Critique of the
New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 9 (2015) (arguing that the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence “facilitates racial domination” in part because of how it incorporates
concerns about balkanization).
27
That is, at a very general level, the approach considers many of the same dynamics in
race relations that progressive scholars of equal protection also consider highly relevant to
the proper pursuit of racial equality—for example, stereotyping, stigma, and racial division—
and it does so in ways that do not seem disingenuous or purely results-driven. See infra
Sections I.C, I.F.
28
That is, proponents show a seeming willingness to learn about the realities of race over
their career and to take persistent racial inequality seriously beyond simplistic a priori
ideological commitments. See infra Section I.F. While this willingness appears to be limited
and to have gone down in extent with more recently appointed antibalkanization Justices, it
does differentiate the approach from the anticlassification approach, whose proponents also
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latter is demonstrated by proponents’ willingness to support race-conscious racial
equality initiatives later in their careers when their prior jurisprudence did not require
them to do so.29 Through this willingness, antibalkanization proponents have preserved important constitutional space for race-conscious racial equality initiatives
in a period of the Court’s history generally characterized by ascendant and aggressive
colorblindness ideology.30
And yet, the approach’s regressive reality lies in the fact that this progressive
potential has been compromised by the approach’s flawed baseline assumptions
about the nature and dynamics of racial inequality.31 These flawed assumptions, in
turn, lead the approach to put in place flawed prescriptions for how to facilitate racial
equality progress.32 Specifically, the approach proceeds from a version of what CRT
scholars have called the “perpetrator perspective” of racial discrimination,33 which
has three basic characteristics: (1) a baseline view that absent strong evidence to the
contrary in a particular context, American society is presumptively racially egalitarian; (2) a conviction that deviations from racial equality are primarily caused by the
specific actions of blameworthy individual actors who are violating this shared norm;
and (3) a conclusion that therefore the main purpose of racial equality law is to
police and prevent the inappropriate behavior of such perpetrators.34 CRT scholars
have criticized this perspective because (1) it misrepresents actual baseline realities
include some of the same racial equality dynamics in their reasoning, but the way in which
they do so makes it hard to resist the conclusion that they are merely justifying pre-existing
ideological objections to race-conscious racial equality efforts. See id.
29
See id. The existing literature has not yet uncovered this internal progression in the
jurisprudence of antibalkanization proponents. It thus misses this aspect of the approach’s
progressive potential.
30
See generally Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
31
See infra Part II.
32
See infra Part III.
33
For the classic formulation of this perspective and an argument that it underlies constitutional discriminatory intent doctrine, see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). For an application in the Fourth Amendment context, see Devon
W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002).
34
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 33, at 1054 (“From [the perpetrator] perspective, the law
views racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct
of particular actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of these misguided ones, the
system of equality of opportunity would work to provide a distribution of the good things in
life without racial disparities and where deprivations that did correlate with race would be
‘deserved’ by those deprived on grounds of insufficient ‘merit.’ . . . [T]he task of antidiscrimination law is to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy individuals who are
violating the otherwise shared norm.”); Carbado, supra note 33, at 968 (Fourth Amendment
doctrine “reflects a perpetrator perspective in the sense that race becomes doctrinally relevant
only to the extent that the presumption of race neutrality and colorblindness can be rebutted
by specific evidence that a particular police officer exhibits overtly racist behavior—in other
words, is obviously a perpetrator of racism.”).
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of deep racial inequality;35 (2) this inequality is perpetuated to a significant extent
by deep-seated structural forces that operate independently of blameworthy conduct
by specific ill-intentioned actors; and (3) racial equality law must thus incorporate
structural interventions if it is to be effective.36
In trying to navigate the relationship between racial conflict and race-conscious
government action, the antibalkanization approach replicates the basic characteristics
of the perpetrator perspective and thus is subject to similar critiques. This Article
sets out both aspects in detail.
As for replicating the perpetrator perspective, the approach (1) assumes as a baseline view that white Americans are committed to racial equality progress (if in a fragile
way) and will generally accept racial equality interventions without hostility and resentment (so long as the government structures them properly);37 (2) reasons that racial
hostility and resentment among white Americans results primarily from overzealous or
sloppy reliance on race by the government—i.e., when the government acts as a “racial
hostility perpetrator”;38 and (3) as a result, strictly restricts race-conscious equality
initiatives to those in which it considers the government not to be acting as such a
perpetrator.39 The approach is particularly restrictive toward initiatives with a remedial
purpose, which it views as especially likely to cause racial hostility and resentment.40
However: (1) As social science research illustrates, a baseline assumption that
white Americans will accept racial equality interventions without hostility and resentment is not justified.41 (2) This is because White racial hostility and resentment is
to a significant extent a structural phenomenon that is tied to the dynamics of racial
hierarchy. It is triggered by threats to the dominant position of Whites in the hierarchy
and is not dependent on any governmental perpetrator.42 (3) Thus, if part of the goal
35
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 1139, 1200 (2008) (noting “racial asymmetr[ies]” in the ways in which distributions
of social benefits and burdens “are already stacked in ways that prefer whites and disadvantage
blacks”); David Simson, Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on You Again:
How Disparate Treatment Doctrine Perpetuates Racial Hierarchy, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 1033,
1067–71 (2019) (discussing “baseline errors” about existing racial inequality that underlie
employment discrimination doctrine).
36
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 149, 159 (2014) (explaining CRT position that “racial
disparities cannot be fully reduced to or predicted from individual behavior and are instead a
function of structural forces” and noting that “[t]he effects of remedial approaches that focus on
individuals can be quite pernicious”); Haney López, supra note 21, at 8 (“Because race exists
as an integral, structural component of social reality and human relations, racial remediation
is impossible except in the company of wide-ranging social reform and human advancement.”).
37
See infra Section I.B.
38
See infra Section I.C.
39
See infra Section I.D.
40
See infra id.
41
See infra Sections II.A, II.C.
42
See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
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of equal protection doctrine is to facilitate movement toward a society that features
both racial equality and social cohesion, it should incorporate more discretion, not
less, for government actors pursuing structural changes to the conditions of racial
hierarchy. Most prominently, this includes programs with a remedial rationale.43
Laying bare the frustrating duality of the antibalkanization approach helps
strengthen existing critiques of the approach. The most notable existing critiques are
(1) a racial partiality critique based on the fact that the Court has applied its concerns about cohesion only to issues that create possible resentments among White
Americans;44 and (2) a critique that as a result of its focus on reducing the salience
of race in racial equality policymaking, the approach is in conflict with democratic
principles of transparency and accountability.45 The analysis offered in this Article
gives these critiques and their proposed solutions a firmer theoretical foundation.
With respect to racial partiality, understanding that the approach is grounded in a
flawed perpetrator perspective makes clear that, as currently formulated, the approach fails even in its analysis of White resentment. It also suggests that a willingness to adopt the proposed solution to this partiality—also applying the approach to
issues of concern to racial minorities46—is analytically dependent on a prior willingness to replace the perpetrator perspective with its opposite: a “victim perspective.”47
43

See infra Part III.
I call these issues the approach’s “core territory.” This territory covers contexts in which
the government voluntarily uses racial minority group membership as a positive factor in resource distributions, such as in affirmative action programs; or in a way meant to ensure that
the interests of racial minority group members are adequately protected, such as in raceconscious districting. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 1359 (noting that currently “antibalkanization opinions [seem to] focus exclusively . . . on the constitutionality of civil rights
laws and initiatives”). One might distinguish this “core territory” from the approach’s
broader hypothetical “logical territory” that would include all government uses of race that
may cause resentment, including among racial minorities, such as racial profiling. See, e.g.,
Joshi, supra note 22, at 2529–31; Siegel, supra note 26, at 42–50, 93; Siegel, supra note 14,
at 1359. A related racial partiality critique is that in its balkanization-based arguments, the
Court has inappropriately adopted the specific viewpoints of White Americans over conflicting
viewpoints of people of color on important issues in equal protection doctrine. See Hutchinson,
supra note 26, at 48–55.
45
See Emerson, supra note 15, at 208–10. While discussing the approach only briefly,
Kiel Brennan-Marquez similarly argues that it mistakenly elevates form over substance and
may be perceived as disingenuous or dishonest as a result. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Magic
Words, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 759, 782–83 (2015).
46
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 14, at 1362–65 (criminal suspect descriptions); Siegel,
supra note 26, at 93–94 (stop and frisk and suspect apprehension).
47
See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 33, at 970 (advocating shift from perpetrator to victim
perspective to ensure that Fourth Amendment law, including with respect to racial profiling,
becomes sensitive to the fact that “people of color often experience their race as a crime of
identity” and to “the coercive and disciplinary ways in which race structures the interaction
between police officers and nonwhite persons”).
44
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With respect to the approach’s transparency deficit, the ability to convince antibalkanization proponents to accept more open engagement with issues of race in
policymaking48 is dependent on making a strong case that the approach’s focus on
reducing the salience of race has failed not because of poor implementation, but because it is mistaken in its fundamental assumptions.49 This Article makes that case.
Perhaps more importantly, recognizing the approach’s frustrating duality uncovers
important implications for actors with an interest in contributing to racial equality
progress.50 Most broadly, understanding the flaws of the approach’s perpetrator
perspective undermines the assumption “that social cohesion is a prerequisite for
equality.”51 It suggests instead that while racial solidarity and social cohesion are
valuable long-term goals for American society, reaching these goals will likely
require accepting short-term racial tension as a necessary corollary of the path of
structural change that needs to be traveled.52 For policymakers such as the Biden
administration, this means that progress toward truly accomplishing the goal of
“root[ing] out systemic racism”53 will require a break from the past practice of
prioritizing white harmony over decisive structural intervention in the hopes that
racial equality progress will organically materialize on its own over time.54 The prospect of reactionary white racial hostility and resentment, in other words, should not
cause a pulling back from decisive structural interventions.
For the Court, a number of lessons seem clear, though their likelihood of being
adopted will depend on the Court’s ideological rigidity, especially after its most
recent changes in composition.55 Most directly related to this Article’s analysis, the
Court should adjust equal protection doctrine to give more discretion to government
actors who voluntarily implement race-conscious programs with a remedial rationale.56 This change is of urgent importance: Pushed by social movement activism
as part of the ongoing reckoning over race and policing, government actors around
48

See Emerson, supra note 15, at 223–31 (calling for administrative law approach to
equal protection); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 45, at 783 (calling for approach to equal
protection that focuses on substance rather than form of race-conscious intervention).
49
Cf. Emerson, supra note 15, at 207–08 (noting correctly that “[i]n the years since [the]
approach has been embraced, racial tensions have not abated” but not investigating in depth
why this has been so).
50
See infra Part III.
51
Siegel, supra note 14, at 1350.
52
Social science research on the “irony of harmony” supports this point. See infra Part III.
53
See Phillips, supra note 5.
54
See supra notes 8, 11.
55
See, e.g., Joshi, supra note 22, at 2560–61 (projecting the “prospect of a durable conservative majority on the Supreme Court” and suggesting that “[t]he question is no longer
whether but when and how a post-Kennedy Court will break with the constitutional precedent
established in Bakke and its progeny”). Since Joshi’s projection, the Court tilted even further
in the conservative direction with Justice Barrett’s replacement of the late Justice Ginsburg.
56
See infra notes 349–78 and accompanying text.
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the country may be both motivated to implement such remedial programs and yet
deterred by the Court’s restrictive jurisprudence. At a minimum, members of the
Court’s conservative majority who share the antibalkanization approach’s willingness to learn about the dynamics of race should vote to preserve the fragile status
quo that permits some race-consciousness in higher education and redistricting as
new challenges to these practices return to the Court.57 If, as is perhaps most likely,
the Court will pull back from race-consciousness instead, this Article makes plain
the deleterious consequences of such a choice for both long-term racial equality and
social cohesion.58 If it is true that to protect its own legitimacy the Court often tries
to predict and stay in line with society’s long-term values,59 both social activism and
legal scholarship have a role to play in describing what those values could and should
be and how legal doctrine could effectively be reconciled with them. This has been
a project of CRT for three decades now.60 Will these calls be heard when it matters
most? Scholars such as Derrick Bell have raised grave doubts.61 But as a saying in
my native German language goes: “Die Hoffnung stirbt zuletzt.” Hope dies last.
This Article suggests that there are some reasons for hope, small as they may be.
Fueling this hope and holding those who could take it up but refuse to do so accountable should be a worthwhile endeavor in legal scholarship.62
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part I describes the antibalkanization
approach in depth to uncover both parts of its frustrating duality: its regressive
57

Indeed, the Supreme Court recently decided to take up a challenge to Harvard’s use
of race in its college admissions system, consolidated alongside a similar affirmative action
suit against the University of North Carolina. Adam Liptak & Anemona Hartocollis, Supreme
Court Will Hear Challenge to Affirmative Action at Harvard and U.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 2022), https:/www.nytimes.com/2022/01/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmative-action
-harvard-unc.html. For a detailed analysis, see Jonathan P. Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How
Affirmative Action Myths Mask White Bonus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 707 (2019).
58
See infra Part II.
59
See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 383 (2007) (“It is a commonplace of history and
political science that . . . in the long run, our constitutional law is plainly susceptible to
political influence.”).
60
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“Although Critical Race scholarship differs in object,
argument, accent, and emphasis, it is nevertheless unified by two common interests. The first
is to understand how a regime of White supremacy and its subordination of people of color
have been created and maintained in America, and, in particular, to examine the relationship
between that social structure and professed ideals such as ‘the rule of law’ and ‘equal protection.’ The second is a desire not merely to understand the vexed bond between law and
racial power but to change it.”).
61
See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) [hereinafter
Bell, Racial Realism]; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
62
Bell, Racial Realism, at 378 (“Continued struggle can bring about unexpected benefits
and gains that in themselves justify continued endeavor. The fight in itself has meaning and
should give us hope for the future.”).
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grounding in a perpetrator perspective but also the component parts of its progressive potential. Part II turns to social science research to demonstrate the flaws of the
approach’s perpetrator perspective and to illustrate the structural dimensions of
White racial hostility and resentment. Part III discusses implications.
I. ANTIBALKANIZATION ASSUMPTIONS—RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
GOVERNMENT AS A RACIAL HOSTILITY PERPETRATOR
This Part describes in greater detail than prior scholarship the multistep logic of
the antibalkanization approach to uncover its “frustrating duality.” To situate this
analysis, a brief terminological point: The name “antibalkanization” approach might
suggest that the approach’s main concern is racial division.63 While racial division
is a significant concern for the approach, it is only one among others, including:
stereotyping; “racial politics”; stigmatization; and, most crucially, racial hostility
and resentment.64 To fully understand the approach it is important to see how the
approach views these issues as connected in what I call a “bias cascade.”65 The approach attends to this cascade closely because it views it as the major obstacle (though
one that can sometimes be overcome) to the accomplishment of its underlying racial
equality goal.
63

This risk is closest to the epistemological origin of the term balkanization, which alludes
to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia (a former nation state in the region of the world often
called the “Balkans”) into multiple states and the tragic ethnic conflict that accompanied it.
Justices have warned that a similar risk of racial division is associated with governmental uses
of race and have made specific reference to the term “balkanization” in the context of raceconscious redistricting. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 92 (1995). As described below, however, the
Court has warned of the risk of racial division in other doctrinal contexts as well.
64
Many of these concepts have been analyzed by strict scrutiny literature as potential
“constitutional harms” that the Court has used to both justify its conclusion that racial classifications by the government must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, and to evaluate when
a government’s use of race is sufficiently important and precise to survive strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1195 (2002); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive
Approach to Strict Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Kim
Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2331 (2000); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Michael J.
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1023 (1979). But this literature tends to analyze these harms as individual and independent
concerns, whereas this Part illustrates how the antibalkanization approach is most concerned
with their interaction in a “bias cascade.”
65
My use of this term is loosely derived from Cass Sunstein’s analysis of the related
phenomenon of “backlash” and its influence on judicial decision-making. See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 155 (2007) (discussing relevance of systemic bias and informational cascades); Cass
R. Sunstein, Backlash’s Travels, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2007).
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A. The Racial Equality Goal: Substantive Equal Opportunity
The antibalkanization approach pursues as its stated end-goal an ideal of racial
equality that is comparatively progressive. It goes beyond the vision of equal protection generally associated with the anticlassification approach, which demands mere
formal equal treatment.66 Instead, it pursues a genuine equal opportunity society—that
is, “a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal
opportunity and achievement.”67 Different Justices have formulated this goal in
different ways depending on the circumstances,68 but the formulations all share
similarities with the goal expressed in 1978 by perhaps the foremost proponent of
antisubordination on the Court, Justice Marshall: “a fully integrated society, one in
which the color of a person’s skin will not determine the opportunities available to
him or her.”69 I call this end goal “substantive equal opportunity.”70
Crucially, antibalkanization Justices are clear about their conviction that American
society has not yet reached this end-goal. It is “a society . . . in which race unfortunately still matters,”71 and in which it is an “unfortunate fact that irrational racial
66

This vision of equality is encapsulated in the often-quoted syllogism of Chief Justice
Roberts that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
67
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–06 (1989).
68
Justice Kennedy, for example, has spoken of the nation’s “moral and ethical obligation
to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity
for all of its children” in the school desegregation context. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens has expressed his desire for a “time when race will
become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor” in determining people’s business
success in the context of public contracting. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Both Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have noted the “goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire,” in the voting rights context. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (opinion of O’Connor, J.); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Similarly, Justice O’Connor has noted that
“[a]s a Nation we aspire to create a society untouched by [America’s] history of exclusion,
and to ensure that equality defines all citizens’ daily experience and opportunities as well as
the protection afforded to them under law.” Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 611
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
69
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
70
One can, of course, question whether Justices are ultimately pursuing the goals that
they state in their opinions. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 64, at 451 (arguing that the way in
which strict scrutiny has been applied by the Court suggests that the Court is not pursuing
the purposes it says underlie the doctrine). For purposes of this Article, I take the Justices’
proclamations at face value to inquire whether their doctrinal choices, and the justifications
for those choices, are well-designed to accomplish their stated end-goal.
71
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at
787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality
is that too often it does.”).
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prejudice—along with its lingering effects—still survives.”72 Thus, the question
whether government actors may rely on race in efforts that try to overcome this
persisting racial inequality is squarely raised. The antibalkanization approach has
developed its own unique answer—dissatisfied with both anticlassification Justices’
claim that the only sure way to guarantee racial equality is to immediately cease all
reliance on race; and antisubordination Justices’ claim that “[i]n order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. . . . [a]nd in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently.”73 In this unique answer, ideas about how
governmental racial equality interventions cause people to relate to each other—
either positively in ways that foster social cohesion or negatively in ways that foster
racial hostility and resentment—take center stage. The way in which the approach
implements these ideas can only be understood fully, however, in the context of
basic assumptions the approach makes about American democracy and about how
progress toward greater racial equality can and cannot be achieved within it.
B. Basic Assumptions About Race Relations and Democracy
Proponents of the approach understand American democracy as one in which
“[t]he enduring hope is that race should not matter” but “the reality is that too often
it does.”74 Still, the approach views American democracy as a “responsible, functioning”75 one with “the capacity—and the duty—to learn from its past mistakes; to
discover and confront persisting biases.”76 In this democracy, well-meaning people
will “by respectful, rational deliberation . . . rise above those flaws and injustices”77 if
only they are put into the right (or at least not into the wrong) environments by the
government through its laws. In other words, American democracy is at a stage of
development where there is a basic commitment to racial equality, including by White
Americans,78 but because of the country’s difficult racial history, this commitment
72

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 260 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
74
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75
Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 312 (2014).
76
Id. at 313.
77
Id. See also id. (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the voters
are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”); see
also Joshua S. Sellers, Election Law and White Identity Politics, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1515,
1560 (2019) (noting that the decision in Schuette was grounded in a view of the anti-affirmative
action referendum at issue being “the manifestation of a healthy democracy” and more generally noting that “optimism pervades election law jurisprudence”).
78
This commitment is reflected in the approach’s view that “it is appropriate to presume
that [antidiscrimination] law has generally been obeyed.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
538, 540 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
501 & n.3 (rejecting “unsupported assumption that white prime contractors simply will not
hire minority firms” and noting that the government had “point[ed] to no evidence that its
prime contractors ha[d] been violating [a pre-existing] antidiscrimination ordinance”).
73
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is perpetually fragile. There is a “race-consciousness” that is generally only “latent,”
but which also sits ready to be “stimulate[d]” at any time.79
In this context, the way in which the government employs its lawmaking power
in the service of racial equality plays a crucial role in either supporting or obstructing
the ability of American “society . . . to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy.”80 This is because, if well-executed, “the law dispels fears and preconceptions
respecting racial attitudes” “[b]y the dispassionate analysis which is its special
distinction.”81 But if poorly executed, it can “foster intolerance and antagonism,”82
“exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice,” and thereby “delay the time when
race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor.”83 Thus, the stakes
for judicial evaluation of government interventions into the racial equality process
are high. Racial harmony is conducive to racial equality progress, but racial conflict
is not84—indeed, such conflict “is at war with the democratic ideal.”85 The key to
racial equality progress, then, is to prevent the government from becoming a “racial
hostility perpetrator” that subverts the basic but fragile equality commitments of white
Americans via poorly designed and off-putting racial equality measures. The approach
thus sees its duty as that of “channeling” government action toward interventions
that ensure racial harmony, and away from interventions that cause racial conflict.86
Its overall goal is to ensure that the government puts well-meaning people into harmonious environments that jumpstart the process toward greater racial equality instead
of reigniting the racial antagonisms that have poisoned race relations in the past.
As described below, in pursuing this goal, antibalkanization proponents follow
a reasoning process that incorporates many issues that progressive scholars of equal
protection also consider highly relevant to the proper pursuit of racial equality—
including stereotyping, stigmatization, and racial division. But they fail to incorporate these issues into a structural approach, instead remaining trapped in a flawed
perpetrator perspective of what causes racial hostility and resentment among White
79

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977)).
80
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
81
Id. at 631.
82
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83
Id.
84
See Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 310 (2014) (“In the
realm of policy discussions the regular give-and-take of debate ought to be a context in which
rancor or discord based on race is avoided, not invited.”).
85
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648–49 (1993) (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52, 66–67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
86
Siegel, supra note 14, at 1302–33 (“Antibalkanization vindicates constitutional values
by authorizing representative institutions to promote equality, while imposing on courts responsibility for constraining the form of political interventions so as to ameliorate resentments
they may engender. Antibalkanization thus understands the judicial role not as mandating or
managing, but as channeling constitutional politics that vindicate equality values.”).
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Americans. As a result, the approach falls short in identifying those legal interventions that are necessary to effectively combat America’s persistent racial hierarchy and
create a true equal opportunity society—indeed, it undermines the constitutionality
of such interventions.
C. How to Be a Racial Hostility Perpetrator
1. The Source of All Problems: Classifications and Equivalents
The key starting point of the approach is its ambivalent position on racial
classifications. On the one hand, proponents believe that the government should not
be completely prohibited from taking race into consideration when distributing
benefits and burdens.87 The approach recognizes the long-standing history of racebased discrimination against racial minorities that has created problems which
government actors should not be required to ignore.88
At the same time, this history has also created an environment in which calling
attention to race comes with certain risks and encourages biased behaviors, explained in more detail below, that make it particularly likely that when the government
relies on race it will become a “racial hostility perpetrator.” Antibalkanization proponents therefore conclude that there should be deep judicial “skepticism”89 whenever the government uses race “too much” in distributing benefits and burdens.90
87

See, e.g., Schuette, 572 U.S. at 300 (recognizing “the principle that the consideration
of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met”); Shaw, 509 U.S.
at 642 (“This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible
in all circumstances.”).
88
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it.”).
89
Id. at 223.
90
“Too much” in this context could mean too “extensively” to the exclusion of other relevant factors, a problem which scholars have called “value reductionism.” See, e.g., Richard
H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 500
(1993) (“When decisions reflect value reductionism, policymakers have transformed a
decision process that ought to involve multiple values—as a matter of constitutional law—
and reduced it to a one-dimensional problem. They have permitted one value to subordinate
all other relevant values.”). It could also mean too “obviously.” See, e.g., Emerson, supra
note 15, at 199–202 (arguing that the key concern is whether the use of race is “too obvious
and transparent to the affected public”). As Neil Siegel suggests, both concerns circulate in
the case law. Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 805 (2006) (Relevant case
law “insists that government not overuse race: it must not treat individuals ‘too much’ as
members of racial groups, whether by literally overusing race or by needlessly impressing
upon them and others that it is treating them in part as members of racial groups” and the
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This concern is most decisively triggered when the government relies on explicit
racial classifications—a notoriously vague concept that at a general level means that
the government uses racial categories as part of its explicitly stated decision-making
criteria.91 Racial classifications that are applied on an individual by individual basis
are considered to be particularly problematic.92 However, the Court has also raised
similar concerns when governmental decision-making is facially race-neutral but
viewed by the Court as the equivalent of an explicit classification because of the
extent to which it is influenced by racial considerations.93 This is the case when race
becomes the “predominant factor” in governmental decision-making.94
“key consideration” in determining what is too much “is the Court’s judgment about how government’s use of race is likely to impact racial balkanization in America over the long run.”).
91
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (“The special
admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To
the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill
the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described
as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.”). The Court has
not clearly defined the concept or given it consistent meaning. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note
14, at 1361–62 (noting that “to date, the Court has never defined what a racial classification
is”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation
in Equal Protection Law after Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1158 n.222
(2016) (noting “ambiguity in what constitutes a ‘classification’”). The broad definition I use
here is not intended to take a position on any “true” meaning of the term, but simply to capture
the Court’s usage.
92
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 795
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for
differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake.”).
93
Stephen Rich calls this “inferred classifications,” which he defines as facially raceneutral actions that the Court believes threaten the same constitutional equality values as an
explicit racial classification. See Stephen M. Rich, Inferred Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV.
1525, 1531–32, 1560 (2013).
94
The use of race as a “predominant factor” has been a particular issue in the redistricting
context, where the Court has recognized that in drawing facially race-neutral district lines,
“legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics.” Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 915 (1995); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and
Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1602 (2002)
(noting that redistricting is “formally race neutral in the sense that the lines on the map contain
no racial references at all”). However, once race becomes the “predominant factor” in the
process, the Court considers it a “racial gerrymander” to which it must apply strict scrutiny
(and often strike it down). Miller, 515 U.S. at 912, 916; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
905 (1996) (“The constitutional wrong occurs when race becomes the ‘dominant and controlling’ consideration.”). Still, antibalkanization opinions have raised similar concerns in
other contexts as well. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392–93 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“[A]n educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that
each applicant receives individual consideration and that race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”).
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The initial doctrinal consequence of a finding that the government used an explicit racial classification or its facially race-neutral equivalent is that the Court will
apply “strict scrutiny,” the most difficult-to-meet constitutional test.95 Whether a
particular use of race is truly “too much,” in the sense that it becomes unconstitutional, is then determined by applying strict scrutiny. The specific way in which the
approach applies strict scrutiny is discussed in more detail below.96 For now, the
takeaway is that under the approach everything turns on whether the government
uses race “too much.” When it does, the government becomes a presumptive racial
hostility perpetrator by starting the bias cascade described below that ultimately
prevents progress toward substantive equal opportunity by causing counterproductive
racial hostility and resentment. Therefore, unless the government can overcome this
presumption97 by showing that it was not such a perpetrator in a given instance—
because it structured its use of race carefully in a way that interrupts the cascade
before it leads to racial hostility and resentment—the use of race must be prohibited
in the name of racial equality itself. When no classification or equivalent is used, by
contrast, a more deferential test applies98 because the government is viewed as
unlikely to be stimulating racial hostility and resentment.
2. Internal Bias: The Government’s Own Stereotyping and “Racial Politics”
Why would the mere fact that the government used a racial classification presumptively turn the government into a racial hostility perpetrator? At the most basic
level, antibalkanization proponents believe that “[b]ecause racial characteristics so
seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,”99 their use is inherently
95

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); Miller, 515 U.S. at 919–20 (“Race was . . .
the predominant, overriding factor [in redistricting]. As a result, Georgia’s congressional redistricting plan cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.”).
96
See infra Section I.D.
97
To be clear, antibalkanization opinions do not explicitly reason in terms of such a
presumption. My use of the term is as an analogy.
98
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that where school integration “mechanisms are race
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification . . . it is unlikely
[that they] would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible”); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 959 (1996) (“For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate
districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race.”).
99
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533–35 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (approvingly
citing this language). This assumption has been challenged, especially from Justices following
an antisubordination approach. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“Because the consideration of race is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past
racial discrimination, and because governmental programs employing racial classifications
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suspicious. Proponents have supported this conclusion with a variety of reasons,
including that constitutional equality rights are individual, personal rights, and thus
the only relevant considerations for government decisions should be individual
attributes rather than group-level characteristics like race;100 that race has no relationship to individual merit, which ought to be the basis for governmental decisionmaking;101 that race is immutable and therefore reliance on race is unfair;102 and that
the problematic history of race suggests that the government generally cannot be
trusted to use race responsibly.103
Why would a government actor make the problematic decision to use race anyway? The approach suggests that the likely answer is that the government is acting
for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigmatization, . . . such programs should not
be subjected to conventional ‘strict scrutiny.’”).
100
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Because the Fourteenth
Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’ all ‘governmental action based on race—a
group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right
to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.’”) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
As Neil Siegel pointed out, this argument is not particularly convincing because providing
individualized consideration to a person based on their personal attributes “is perfectly
consistent with the consideration of group characteristics, including race. Government cannot
govern through generally applicable laws without distinguishing among individuals based
on group characteristics; the criteria—any criteria—are defined by groups.” Siegel, supra
note 90, at 789. Instead, the “task is to decide which criteria are relevant to government’s
choices among individuals.” Id. at 790 (emphasis added). I mention this argument not because
I agree with it, but to illustrate the bases antibalkanization proponents have raised for their
suspicion against racial classifications.
101
See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”);
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting as “utterly irrational”
“the ‘premise that differences in race, or in the color of a person’s skin, reflect real differences that are relevant to a person’s right to share in the blessings of a free society’”)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
For an insightful counterargument that race and merit are related in complex ways, see, e.g.,
Devon W. Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky & Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, Privileged or Mismatched:
The Lose-Lose Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA
L. REV. DISC. 174 (2016).
102
See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Racial classifications
must be assessed under the most stringent level of review because immutable characteristics,
which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental
decision.”). For a more complex understanding of race, see, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
103
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (“The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive
pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.”) (quoting Richmond
v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989)).
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on its own racial bias by engaging in racial stereotyping,104 which is likely to shade
into undesirable “racial politics.” The approach’s concern about stereotyping is
multifaceted and discussed further below. But the first important worry is that
reliance on the group-level category of race indicates that the government is making
improper generalizations about the individuals affected by its policies105: the government is treating citizens “as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts
and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the
Government by history and the Constitution.”106 In other words, the government’s
use of race suggests that it assumes that all members of a particular racial group are
alike in a given context107 when in reality “[t]he racial generalization inevitably does
not apply to certain individuals, and those persons may legitimately claim that they
have been judged according to their race rather than upon a relevant criterion.”108
This general concern about government stereotyping is not necessarily disingenuous, and progressive scholars have also raised it as a potential racial equality
obstacle in contexts that are in the approach’s core territory.109 The perhaps clearest
example is the critique of “negative action” against Asian Americans in university
admissions that may result from such stereotyping.110 My point here is limited. It is
104

See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 552–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (warning about “[t]he
risk that habitual attitudes toward classes of persons, rather than analysis of the relevant
characteristics of the class, will serve as a basis for a legislative classification”).
105
See, e.g., Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “essential
equal protection principles . . . prohibit racial generalizations”); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra
note 64, at 2355 (“By stereotypes, the Court seems to have in mind generalizations about a
person or group of people based on their race.”).
106
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (approvingly quoting
this language).
107
See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (“When the State assigns voters on the basis of
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race,
because of their race, ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls.’”) (internal citation omitted); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 632 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (criticizing “the step, which itself should be forbidden, of enacting into law
the stereotypical assumption that the race of owners is linked to broadcast content”).
108
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Schuette v. Coal.
to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 308 (2014) (“It cannot be entertained as a serious
proposition that all individuals of the same race think alike.”).
109
There are, of course, many examples of governmental stereotyping that disadvantage
racial minority groups outside of the core territory of the approach. The internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II based on wholesale stereotyping of possible race-based
“disloyalty” is a particularly infamous example. See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness
in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40
B.C. L. REV. 73 (1998).
110
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3, 41 (1996)
(defining negative action as “unfavorable treatment based on race, using the treatment of
Whites as a basis for comparison” and discussing how negative action could arise in university admissions based on negative stereotyping of Asian Americans grounded in the
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not that all governmental uses of race are the result of negative stereotyping,111 but
simply that it need not be disingenuous for well-meaning antibalkanization Justices
to be worried about governmental stereotyping in the approach’s core territory.
Why might the government behave in such a sloppy and problematic way? The
approach assumes that there is a large risk that the reason is another type of bias:
“racial politics,” meaning an attempt by members of particular racial groups to
circumvent merit-based decision-making and “to negotiate ‘a piece of the action’ for
its members.”112 Because racial politics embodies racial preference for its own
sake,113 the Court must vigilantly guard against it.114 Most importantly for purposes
of this Article, this is particularly the case because stereotyping and “racial politics”
practiced by the government (or the appearance thereof) cascade onward into society
more broadly and poison the intergroup harmony that the approach thinks is necessary for progress toward racial equality.
3. External Bias: Stereotyping by Others, Racial Division, Stigmatization
The approach worries that the actions of the government signal powerfully what
kinds of thoughts and behaviors are right or wrong for people at large, and thus can
“model minority” myth); Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans
Toward a Community of Justice, a Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 129, 159 (1996) (“[I]n cases of proven racial disparities between APA and White
admission rates, the causes have been either stereotypical treatment of APA applicants or
other preferences, such as that for alumni children, who tend to be predominantly White.”).
111
Indeed, scholars who have critiqued negative action have made clear that such a critique
does not necessitate opposing the government’s use of race in affirmative action programs.
Kang, supra note 110, at 44–46; Chin et al., supra note 110, at 159–60.
112
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (approvingly citing this language).
113
See, e.g., Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 615 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (warning about the
risk of “naked preferences for members of particular races” when racial classifications are
used); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[I]f [a race-based] set-aside merely
expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or ethnic group over another, [it] violates
the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
114
One of the most consistently cited quotes from an antibalkanization opinion is Justice
O’Connor’s admonition in Croson that:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for . . . race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated
by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed,
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race.
488 U.S. at 493; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 783 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting same language approvingly); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
226 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–43 (1993); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 609
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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generate downstream social effects that go far beyond the government’s own direct
sphere of influence. This concern is based partly on the idea noted above that the
problematic history of race has created a “latent race consciousness”115 in American
society. When the government calls attention to race through its actions, this consciousness can easily move from “latent” to “actual,” with problematic repercussions.
Antibalkanization proponents believe that racial stereotyping and politicking by the
government encourages people in general to also think of themselves and others in
racial terms when they otherwise might not.116 That is, when the government uses
race in its decision-making, this “endorse[s] race-based reasoning”117 and “reinforce[s]
habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes instead of individuals.”118 And not only
does it encourage such thinking, it legitimates it as well by “suggesting the utility
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an
individual’s worth or needs.”119 In other words, the government’s use of race turns
it into a racial bias perpetrator by perpetuating and legitimating racial stereotyping
in society at large. Again, this is not necessarily a disingenuous concern. Scholars
have pointed to social science research that suggests that making race more salient
may indeed at times call forth, reinforce, and/or perpetuate stereotypes of racial
minority groups.120 This point is again limited, as many countervailing considerations are at play.121 But an antibalkanization Justice with an interest in “getting
right” their racial equality jurisprudence could genuinely be concerned about the
possible reinforcing of stereotypes when race is relied on in the distribution of
resources and opportunities.
115

Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 547 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647
(Race-conscious redistricting “reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls.”) (emphasis added).
119
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
120
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1263–71 (1998); Linda R. Tropp, Amy E. Smith
& Faye J. Crosby, The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jefferson County Desegregation
Cases: Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 93,
101–04 (2007).
121
For example, race-consciousness may simultaneously be necessary to create environments that facilitate the undoing of stereotypes. See, e.g., id. at 104–05; Elise C. Boddie,
Critical Mass and the Paradox of Colorblind Individualism in Equal Protection, 17 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 781, 799 (2015). Similarly, the possibility that race-consciousness may reinforce
stereotypes may not outweigh the fact that eliminating race-consciousness would be highly
counterproductive to racial equality goals in the absence of more effective alternatives.
Krieger, supra note 120, at 1276–1329.
116
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The antibalkanization approach’s concern with stereotyping, moreover, is not
put forth for its own sake. Instead, it is the foundation for worries that such cognitive
biases have deeper implications by encouraging a vision of society that the approach
otherwise sees in the past and prefers to keep there: a society characterized by racial
division. As Justice Kennedy has put it: “Government action that classifies individuals
on the basis of race . . . carries the danger of perpetuating the very racial divisions
the polity seeks to transcend.”122 The approach is concerned that when people think
about themselves and others in racial terms—as encouraged by the government—
they consequently also conceive of society as separated into different racial “blocs”123
and define their interests and allegiances primarily at the racial bloc-level rather than
at the narrower individual level or at a broader, societal level.124 This divided perception of society (produced by the government’s use of race)—which again progressive equality scholars have also identified as potentially problematic125—in turn risks
taking stereotyping to the next, more pernicious, level of stigmatization.
Stigmatization pushes overbroad generalizations into the even more problematic
territory of harmful social meanings ascribed on the basis of group identity.126 While
122

Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 308 (2014); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Governmental classifications that command people to march in different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness.”).
123
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (raising concern about “carving
electorates into racial blocs”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (Racial classifications “endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of
a Nation divided into racial blocs.”).
124
This concern has been made particularly explicit in the voting context, where opinions
have warned that racial gerrymandering sends a “pernicious” message to elected representatives
“that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of [a particular racial] group,
rather than their constituency as a whole.” Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648. These opinions emphasize
that electoral systems that send such messages are “a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional
sense” and threaten that “the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution
seeks to weld together as one become separatist.” Id. (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 66–67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). But the concern has also been raised in other
contexts. See, e.g., Schuette, 572 U.S. at 308–09 (rejecting interpretation of “political process” doctrine that would turn on whether issues “inur[e] primarily to the benefit of [a racial]
minority” because such doctrine would risk “the creation of incentives for those who support
or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms of racial advantage or disadvantage” and
“[r]acial division would be validated, not discouraged”).
125
See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 (2011)
(discussing how group-based equality approaches may have contributed to “pluralism anxiety,”
i.e., “apprehension of and about [the country’s] demographic diversity” that in turn may be
responsible for a constricted development of equality law and arguing that more universal
“dignity”-based arguments could lead to greater progress). But see Hutchinson, supra note
26, at 10 (critiquing Yoshino’s argument and supporting literature).
126
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 110, at 25 (defining stigma as “a mark signifying that the
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there have been differing conceptualizations of the meaning of “stigma” on the Court
at various times,127 what is most relevant for this Article is that antibalkanization
proponents believe that government uses of race stigmatize everyone who is affected
by them—both their “beneficiaries” and those who are “disadvantaged,”128 albeit in
different ways. The main beneficiaries of programs in the approach’s core territory
are members of racial minority groups.129 One might think that such beneficiaries
are therefore the recipients of racial “preferences”130—and thus perhaps on first sight
would simply be advantaged. But antibalkanization proponents worry that such preferences might in fact be based on, and encourage others to adopt, long-standing
negative social meanings that associate racial minorities with “notions of racial
inferiority”131 and “hold[] that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection.”132 Significantly, according to the approach, once the government
uses race “too much” it is likely to encourage such stigmatization regardless of whether
the government itself holds these negative views or intends to promote them.133
disadvantaged are members of a group worthy of prejudice, in forms ranging from antipathy
to selective indifference”). For a seminal work on racial stigma, see R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004).
127
Lenhardt, supra note 126, at 864–75 (discussing different conceptualizations of stigmatic
harms in case law, such as citizenship harm, psychological harm, reputational harm, and
notions of racial otherness).
128
See, e.g., Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Racial classifications, whether providing benefits to or burdening particular racial or ethnic groups, may
stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment.”).
129
See supra note 44 and accompanying text. My use of the term “main beneficiary” is
limited. It simply refers to the Court’s view of whose interests are primarily benefitted by
such programs. Many such uses of race also benefit White people and society as a whole in
many important ways. See, e.g., infra notes 394–97 and accompanying text.
130
The notion that governmental uses of race that promote greater racial equality involve
“racial preferences” is both popular and problematic. As Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris
have demonstrated, for example, racial preference arguments are based on questionable
“baseline assumptions” about the status quo of racial inequality and overlook many “racial
asymmetr[ies]” in the ways in which distributions of social benefits and burdens “are already
stacked in ways that prefer whites and disadvantage blacks.” Carbado & Harris, supra note
35, at 1200; see also Simson, supra note 35, at 1100–03 (connecting preference rhetoric to
psychological preferences for racial hierarchy).
131
Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also id. at 516–17 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (warning that race-based legislation “actually imposes a greater stigma on its
supposed beneficiaries” than on the “disadvantaged class”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (approvingly quoting same language).
132
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (approvingly quoting same language).
133
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this
special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race.”)
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Importantly for the approach’s racial hostility and resentment conclusions, these
stigmatization fears are compounded by concerns that those who are “disadvantaged”
by governmental uses of race—i.e., Whites, in the approach’s core territory134—are
also stigmatized in various ways. When the governmental use of race is justified on
remedial grounds—i.e., when the government uses race to counteract the past and/or
present effects of racial discrimination against racial minorities—the concern is that
Whites are stigmatized by disregard of their “innocence.”135 That is, Whites are stamped
“with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination.”136 In other words, the government does not merely treat all White Americans as if they are the same (stereotyping),
but it treats them as if they are all perpetrators or beneficiaries of discrimination
against racial minorities (stigmatization).137 When the governmental use of race is
justified on forward-looking grounds, by contrast—for example, when the government uses race to ensure greater diversity of backgrounds, viewpoints, etc., in a
given context—the concern is that Whites are stigmatized by the implication that their
contributions, regardless of their individual circumstances, are considered not as
valuable as those of racial minorities based on their race.138
Here, again, the approach’s general concern about the possibility of racial stigmatization and its further exacerbation of negative stereotypes is consistent with
concerns of progressive scholars,139 some of which have argued that constitutional
(emphasis added); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (approvingly quoting same language);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
134
The framing of Whites as “disadvantaged” by governmental uses of race is the flip side
of the rhetoric that racial minority beneficiaries receive “racial preferences” and thus is subject to the same critique. See supra note 130. While recent anti-affirmative action litigation has
been brought on behalf of Asian American plaintiffs and the public narrative surrounding those
challenges has at times portrayed Asian Americans as the “victims” of affirmative action
programs for other racial minority groups, on closer inspection the plaintiffs’ claims are
actually that Asian Americans are disadvantaged by discrimination in favor of Whites (i.e.,
negative action) separate from Harvard’s affirmative action program. See Feingold, supra
note 57.
135
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 33, at 1055.
136
Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229
(approvingly quoting this language); Metro Broad. Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same). For a detailed analysis of the problematic influence of White
innocence reasoning on equal protection doctrine more generally, see David Simson, Whiteness
as Innocence, 96 DENV. L. REV. 635, 677–88 (2019).
137
Simson, supra note 136, at 646–50 (explaining perpetrator-based and beneficiary-based
conceptions of White innocence).
138
See, e.g., Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing federal
licensing program pursuing greater diversity in broadcasting content as based on the problematic view that “[i]ndividuals of unfavored racial and ethnic backgrounds are unlikely to
possess the unique experiences and background that contribute to viewpoint diversity”).
139
See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 126, at 830–36 (discussing mutually reinforcing relationship
between racial stigma and negative racial stereotypes, though not in the context of programs
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racial equality questions should centrally turn on the question of stigmatization.140
Again also, the point is limited. Many (likely most) such scholars will not agree with
the way in which stigma is mobilized in specific antibalkanization opinions,141 especially as it pertains to the stigmatization of whites.142 But the approach’s concern
about racial stigmatization itself need not be disingenuous, even if it is only somewhat informed.
4. The Ultimate Racial Equality Obstacle: White Racial Hostility and Resentment
If the government’s decision to use a racial classification or its equivalent is the
hazardous starting point for a bias cascade that infuses racial stereotyping into people’s
thinking, divides society, and encourages the proliferation of harmful stigmatic
messages about everyone and anyone, wouldn’t it be logical for those disadvantaged
by such bias to be upset and resentful? Wouldn’t this resentment, grounded as it is
in negative racial meanings and divisions with a dark history, prevent even wellmeaning people with a commitment to racial equality from engaging each other in
a harmonious way that would spur progress toward substantive equal opportunity?
And wouldn’t it make sense to lay responsibility for such counterproductive hostility
and resentment at the feet of the government perpetrator? The antibalkanization
approach emphatically answers yes to all of the above.
Notably, the approach does not view the possibility of racial hostility and resentment as just another problematic aspect of racial classifications. It specifically
sees such hostility and resentment as the culmination of the bias cascade laid out
above and as the ultimate obstacle on the path toward substantive equal opportunity.
As an illustration of this point as well as the approach’s internal logical progression
and consistency over time and across Justices who have applied it, consider the
that benefit racial minority group members); David Simson, Exclusion, Punishment, Racism,
and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective on School Discipline, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 506, 535–49 (2014) (discussing relevance of stigma in context of racial disparities in
school discipline).
140
See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 126, at 890–96; Kang, supra note 110, at 24–30.
141
For example, the concern that governmental efforts to promote greater racial equality
are, in reality, bad for their racial minority beneficiaries has a troubled history which provides
many reasons to be deeply skeptical about accepting such arguments at face value. See
generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual
Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464 (2009).
142
Lenhardt, supra note 126, at 877 (“In far too many cases, the analysis employed by the
Court has been ahistorical and willfully ignorant of relevant contexts, and, thus, necessarily
incomplete.”); Kang, supra note 110, at 44–46 (acknowledging that from the perspective of
a White challenger of an affirmative action program, such a program may broadcast a message
of “antipathy and selective indifference” but ultimately arguing that when this concern is
reconciled with other perspectives “the objective social meaning of affirmative action programs
in general is not strongly stigmatic”); see also generally Simson, supra note 136 (critiquing
reliance on ideology of “white innocence” in race-conscious remedies jurisprudence).
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following three examples from three different Justices and in three different contexts
(though all in the approach’s core territory).
Take as a first example Justice Stevens’ dissent in Fullilove, in which the Court
upheld a Congressional affirmative action program in public contracting that had the
remedial purpose of addressing the effects of prior race discrimination in such
contracting.143 Stevens’ starting point for his opinion, which he grounded in the dark
history of government “monopoly privileges,”144 was suspicion toward racial classifications: “Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate
treatment, and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the
entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such classification
be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.”145 This suspicion was based on
the risk that such classifications often embody a “stereotyped reaction [that] may have
no rational relationship—other than pure prejudicial discrimination—to the stated
purpose for which the classification is being made.”146 Indeed, what he perceived as
the poorly tailored, “slapdash” nature of the program147 suggested to Stevens that what
really motivated Congress was “racial politics,” i.e., minority groups negotiating “a
piece of the action”148 for themselves. The problem with such governmental stereotyping, in turn, was that it encouraged others to stereotype as well, leading to stigmatization: Congress “fostered” an “assumption” that “many” people might be willing
to make when prodded, namely “that those who are granted this special preference
are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race,”149 thus “imply[ing] to some the recipients’ inferiority and especial need for protection.”150
Under such circumstances, the “preference” program would “inevitably . . . engender resentment on the part of competitors excluded”151 and indeed “only exacerbate
143
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980) (setting out remedial purpose of
program at issue). Justice Stevens’s dissent in Fullilove is a particularly important example
because it is repeatedly cited with approval in later decisions by antibalkanization Justices as
accurately setting out the constitutional problems posed by government racial classifications.
144
Id. at 532–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145
Id. at 533–35.
146
Id. at 534 n.4; see also id. at 552–53 (“The risk that habitual attitudes toward classes
of persons, rather than analysis of the relevant characteristics of the class, will serve as a
basis for a legislative classification is present when benefits are distributed as well as when
burdens are imposed.”).
147
Id. at 539.
148
Id. at 542.
149
Id. at 545.
150
Id. at 545 n.17; see also id. at 545 (Preferential treatment will cause “skepticism on the
part of customers and suppliers aware of the statutory classification.”). As noted above, Justice
Stevens believed that these negative meanings would follow “even though [they were] not
the actual predicate for this legislation.” Id.
151
Id.; see also id. at 532–33 (“History teaches us that the costs associated with a sovereign’s grant of exclusive privileges often encompass more than the high prices and shoddy
workmanship that are familiar handmaidens of monopoly; they engender animosity and
discontent as well.”).
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rather than reduce racial prejudice.”152 Therefore, the program would “delay the time
when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor,”153 could not
“be defended as an appropriate method of reducing racial prejudice,”154 would “disserve
the goal of equal opportunity,”155 and therefore should be held unconstitutional.
Take as another example Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Metro Broadcasting,
which upheld a federal licensing program that had the forward-looking purpose of
pursuing greater diversity in broadcasting content through various mechanisms designed to increase racial minority station ownership.156 Kennedy started his dissent
by invoking Plessy v. Ferguson157 to situate the case in the troubling history of the
government’s use of racial classifications for ostensible racial equality purposes.158
Kennedy then criticized the government for its own stereotyping—for “enacting into
law the stereotypical assumption that the race of owners is linked to broadcast
content,”159 and basing its program “on the demeaning notion that members of the
defined racial groups ascribe to certain ‘minority views’ that must be different from
those of other citizens.”160 Worried that this would encourage similar stereotyping
by others, shading quickly into the stigmatization of the program’s “supposed
beneficiaries,” Kennedy warned that “[s]pecial preferences . . . can foster the view
that members of the favored groups are inherently less able to compete on their
own.”161 Turning to the stigmatization of the “disadvantaged group,” Kennedy pointed
to “the danger that the ‘stereotypical thinking’ that prompts policies such as the FCC
rules here ‘stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past
racial discrimination.’”162 This was “not a proposition that the many citizens, who
to their knowledge ‘have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of race’
152

Id. at 545; see also, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that because local
ordinance implementing race-based set-asides in contracting was “not a remedy, but . . . itself
a preference [it] will cause the same corrosive animosities that the Constitution forbids in the
whole sphere of government, and that our national policy condemns in the rest of society as
well”).
153
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 548; see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“The law itself may
not become the instrument for generating the prejudice and hostility all too often directed
against persons whose particular ancestry is disclosed by their ethnic characteristics and cultural traditions.”).
156
See Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 632 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
158
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 631–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority
“exhumes Plessy’s deferential approach to racial classifications”).
159
Id. at 632.
160
Id. at 636.
161
Id.
162
Id. (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 (1989) (opinion of
Stevens, J.)).
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will find easy to accept.”163 What would all of this lead to consequently? “[I]ntolerance
and antagonism against the entire membership of the favored classes,”164 “animosity
and discontent,”165 and “the seeds of race hate . . . planted under the sanction of
law.”166 Kennedy closed with a warning that allowing such bias cascades to fester
would have the ultimate negative consequence of hindering the achievement of
racial equality by subverting racial harmony—and thus was unconstitutional:
Though the racial composition of this Nation is far more diverse
than the first Justice Harlan foresaw, his warning in dissent is
now all the more apposite: “The destinies of the two races, in
this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests
of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law.” . . . Perhaps the tolerance and decency to which our people
aspire will let the disfavored rise above hostility and the favored
escape condescension. But history suggests much peril in this
enterprise, and so the Constitution forbids us to undertake it.167
Take as a final example Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in the voting
rights/redistricting context in Shaw v. Reno. Proceeding from the basic starting point
that “[r]acial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society”
because “[t]hey reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history,
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,”168 O’Connor worried
that racial gerrymanders—in crude fashion—lumped together “individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical
and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but
the color of their skin.”169 Whatever the government’s motivations for doing so, this
would “reinforce[] the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless
of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls . . . [i.e.,] impermissible racial stereotypes.”170 Such stereotyping risked
163

Id. at 637 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (opinion of Stevens, J.))
Id. at 636 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 547 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
165
Id. at 637.
166
Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
167
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Another clear example of Justice
Kennedy applying the approach is his plurality opinion in Schuette, written 24 years after his
dissent in Metro Broad.
168
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
169
Id. at 647.
170
Id.
164
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creating racial divisions, emphasizing that loyalty is properly race-based,171 leading
in turn to “antagonisms . . . at war with the democratic ideal.”172 In other words:
[r]acial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerry-mandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is
for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.173
One could continue throughout the opinions cited for the constituent parts of the
antibalkanization logic outlined above. While not all cases always employ all of the
reasoning steps explicitly and in order, once one understands the underlying antibalkanization approach and logic as laid out above, one can see its through-line
across four decades, multiple different Justices, and across contexts.
D. Racial Hostility Perpetrator or Equality Contributor: Antibalkanization’s
Strict Scrutiny
Lest the above suggests that antibalkanization proponents are no different from
colorblind anticlassificationists who simply mobilize plausible concerns about government uses of race to oppose all racial classifications, it is important to remember
that antibalkanization proponents are clear that they do not reject all uses of race.174
171

Id. at 648 (by perpetuating stereotypes, “a racial gerrymander may exacerbate . . .
racial bloc voting” and will serve “as a divisive force in a community”); see also id. at 650
(Racial gerrymandering “reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system
of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular
racial group rather than their constituency as a whole.”).
172
Id. at 648–49; see also Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 309
(2014) (suggesting that when racial division is “validated, not discouraged,” “racial antagonisms
and conflict tend to arise”).
173
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added).
174
Justice Stevens made clear as early as Fullilove that “I am not convinced that the
[Equal Protection] Clause contains an absolute prohibition against any statutory classification
based on race.” 448 U.S. 448, 548 (1980). Justice Powell took a similar position. See id. at
496 n.1 (“Although racial classifications require strict judicial scrutiny, I do not agree that
the Constitution prohibits all racial classification.”). Similarly, Justice O’Connor called the
petitioners in Shaw “wise” for making the concession “that race-conscious redistricting is not
always unconstitutional.” 509 U.S. at 642. Justice Kennedy has said that while the colorblindness “axiom” of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy should “command our assent” “as
an aspiration,” “[i]n the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional
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It is also important to remember that the approach does not worry about racial
hostility and resentment for their own sake, for example because it simply would
prefer a society without such hostility and resentment. Rather, it views them as
decisive obstacles on the path to the racial equality end-goal of substantive equal
opportunity within its vision of American democracy. That such hostility and resentment are rooted in a bias cascade triggered by the government’s initial decision
to rely on race “too much” is key. In the approach’s view, it is this decision that
threatens to turn well-meaning Whites into racially divided backlashers and antagonists who are no longer willing to engage in dialogue and action in the service of
racial equality when they otherwise would be. This, in turn, obstructs progress toward
substantive equal opportunity.
The conclusion that the anticlassification approach draws from this is that this
danger is so great and problematic that one should stay away from it entirely and
prohibit racial classifications (and perhaps any consideration of race) categorically.175
The antibalkanization approach rejects this categorical conclusion and instead
grounds its constitutional judgments in a “racial hostility perpetrator” analysis. Within
this analysis, the above logic supports a strong presumption that the government acts
unconstitutionally whenever it uses race “too much” because of the likelihood that
doing so triggers the bias cascade and leads to the ultimate racial equality obstacle
of White racial resentment and hostility. But antibalkanization proponents also recognize that the government should not be entirely “disqualified from acting in
response to” “[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects
of racial discrimination against minority groups. . . .”176 Accordingly, the key
constitutional question is not whether the government relied on race as such, but
whether it used race without becoming a racial hostility perpetrator. Because the
approach believes that White racial hostility and resentment is the end-result of
multiple steps in a bias cascade, it recognizes that it is possible (though difficult) for
the government to structure a race-conscious program in a way that prevents this
cascade from unfolding in full.177 If the government does so, but only then, the
approach will consider the race-conscious action conducive to the achievement of
substantive equal opportunity and permit it.
Antibalkanization proponents have chosen strict scrutiny as the vehicle for channeling government actors toward appropriately structured uses of race and away from
inappropriate ones. The bias cascade influences the approach’s application of strict
principle.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
175
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (“As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government’s racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those
who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged.”).
176
Id. at 237; see also supra Section I.A.
177
See also supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny consistently from beginning—what triggers strict scrutiny—to middle—
what government purposes are permissible—to end—what counts as sufficient
tailoring of governmental means to its purposes.
With respect to triggers, what matters for antibalkanization proponents is the
nature of the process through which the government pursues racial equality, as well
as the impact this process has on how Whites and racial minority group members
relate to each other.178 The approach pursues something akin to a “reverse” representation-reinforcement approach.179 Rather than policing the political process to
prevent systematic disadvantaging of vulnerable minorities, the approach polices the
political process so that it reinforces what the approach perceives as the basic good
intentions of most participants (especially Whites) in American democracy and
prevents retriggering the racial antagonism, hostility, and resentment that is the real
obstacle on the path toward substantive equal opportunity. A logical starting point
is an inquiry into whether the government has relied “too much” on race. When a
governmental action “cannot be understood as anything other than”180 based on race,
it is highly likely that it will be perceived by Whites as based on governmental
stereotyping and racial politics in favor of racial minorities. This, in turn, is likely
to trigger the remainder of the bias cascade and a social environment that is likely
to turn from well-meaning to antagonistic and resentful.181 When race is used in such
a way, the government is a presumptive racial hostility perpetrator and the approach
turns to strict scrutiny to determine whether the government can overcome the
presumption by showing that it sufficiently mitigated the bias cascade through the
specifics of its program.
By contrast, the approach assumes that Whites will not perceive programs in
which the government’s reliance on race is more diffuse as based on crude stereotyping and racial politics and thus the bias cascade is less likely to unfold.182 In such
178

See Siegel, supra note 14, at 1301 (“[T]he antibalkanization perspective thinks about
equal protection purposively and structurally: it assesses the constitutionality of government
action by asking about the kind of polity it creates.”).
179
Representation-reinforcement theory is credited to John Hart Ely and argues that
“exacting judicial review is an instrument of process perfection, invalidating laws when the
people’s representatives ‘chok[e] off the channels of political change’ to benefit entrenched
majorities or ‘systematically disadvantag[e] some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced
refusal to recognize commonalities of interest.’” Rich, supra note 93, at 1532 n.30 (quoting
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980)).
180
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993).
181
See supra Section I.C.
182
Cf. Richard A. Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact after Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 295, 313 (2015) (“[I]f the race-conscious aspect [of a
government intervention] is visible and given a divisive social meaning, the [program] causes
a further harm at the societal level. The problem then is not just the particular individual’s
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cases, the government is unlikely to be a racial hostility perpetrator and thus should
receive more leeway in addressing continued racial inequality. This is perhaps the
best explanation for Justice Kennedy’s distinction in Parents Involved between
presumptively permissible race-conscious “general policies” that would be “unlikely”
to be subject to strict scrutiny—such as “strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in
a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race”183—and his subjection to strict scrutiny of plans based on explicit classifications telling “each student he or she is to be defined by race[.]” 184 The former type
of policy, because it was structured less decisively and exclusively around the
perceived interests of racial minority group members, presented concerns about the
bias cascade to a “lesser degree.”185
Similar concerns also influence how the approach structures the actual application of strict scrutiny.186 For example, proponents are more likely to view a government interest as “compelling”187 if they perceive its pursuit as less likely to involve
broad stereotyping or racial politics by the government, or if its pursuit is likely to
interrupt the cascade before it reaches racial hostility or resentment. They view an
interest as less/not compelling if it does the opposite. This is illustrated by the willingness to accept as compelling a university’s interest in achieving the educational
benefits of a diverse student body. Justice O’Connor affirmed the permissibility of
using race as an explicit factor in university admissions in Grutter because she
thought that the pursuit of a diverse student body did not require the government to
rely on racial stereotyping,188 and that therefore such uses of race would not encourage
loss of [an opportunity] but the exacerbation of race as a source of tension and ill-feeling in
the polity at large.”).
183
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy noted that school districts should be permitted to employ
such policies “with candor,” which would make sense if they were unlikely to trigger the bias
cascade and most well-meaning White people could be expected to accept them. Id. at 789.
184
Id. at 789.
185
Id. at 797. As Stephen Rich has noted, Kennedy’s use of terms such as “unlikely” and
“lesser degree” suggests that if the types of policies Kennedy cited approvingly were designed
in a way that their racially neutral aspects were too close of a proxy for race, i.e., if race was
used “too much” after all, a future Court may well apply strict scrutiny. Rich, supra note 93,
at 1583–85. This would be consistent with the antibalkanization logic.
186
Siegel, supra note 26, at 43 (noting “new form of strict scrutiny” devised by antibalkanization proponents).
187
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (Strict scrutiny can only be
met by “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
188
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need
for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue. . . .’ To the contrary, diminishing the
force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it
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stereotyping by others, and perhaps even reduce stereotyping if properly implemented.189 Similarly, pursuing this interest does not require judgments about White
innocence,190 and thus also involves less risk of stigmatizing Whites. Furthermore,
because the pursuit of diversity is an interest in which Whites can also see themselves
represented,191 well-meaning Whites could be expected to accept an appropriately
structured program as “taken in the service of the goal of equality itself,”192 rather
than as racial politics.
The victims of this way of thinking about compelling interests, however, have
been programs that pursue a remedial interest. Even though remedying the effects
of systemic racial discrimination throughout society, in the past and present, has
long been what many people see as a “principal justification for racial affirmative
action,”193 antibalkanization proponents have strictly limited the boundaries of what
counts as a compelling remedial interest. Specifically, they have rejected the interest
in remedying “societal discrimination” and instead demand “identified” discrimination by the government actor at issue.194 This is largely because proponents believe
that approving a broader interest in remedying societal discrimination would be too
likely to permit the government to engage in wholesale stereotyping and racial
politics.195 As a result, pursuit of such an interest would be likely to encourage others
cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”). Instead, using race in
pursuit of diversity accurately recognized that “[b]y virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial
inequality, [underrepresented minority] students are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful
numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.” Id. at 338.
189
Id. at 330 (“[T]he Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons
of different races.’”); see also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (approvingly quoting
this language).
190
Simson, supra note 136, at 664; Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing
Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV. 297, 335–36 (2015).
191
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (“The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants,”
demonstrating that it “seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides race that can make
a real and dispositive difference for nonminority applicants as well.”).
192
Id. at 342 (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).
193
RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
LAW 192 (2013).
194
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982 (1996) (“A State’s interest in remedying
discrimination is compelling when two conditions are satisfied. First, the discrimination that
the State seeks to remedy must be specific, identified discrimination; second, the State must
have had a strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was necessary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 n.1 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Unless
the legislature can identify both the particular victims and the particular perpetrators of past
discrimination . . . a remedial justification for race-based legislation will almost certainly
sweep too broadly.”).
195
See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (Absent findings of discrimination, “there is a danger
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to stereotype in similar fashion, leading to the stigmatization of racial minorities as
inferior and of whites as wholesale perpetrators of racial discrimination, or, at least,
undeserving beneficiaries of racial privilege.196 This is not something that the many
white Americans who don’t see themselves this way “will find easy to accept,”197
leading to “animosity and discontent” and the perpetuation of prejudice, perhaps
even “the seeds of race hate,” all of which obstruct racial equality progress.198 In
other words, pursuit of such an interest turns the government into a counterproductive racial hostility perpetrator. By contrast, the approach assumes that well-meaning
Whites would be less likely to react in the same ways to programs based on identified findings of prior discrimination because such programs would be perceived to
be based not on stereotypes but actual status as victim or perpetrator / beneficiary
of discrimination and thus be “taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.”199
The narrow tailoring requirement ensures that the government does not subvert
the promise of a compelling interest by triggering the bias cascade via unsophisticated
implementation. In doing so, the approach gives more deference if the government
pursues a compelling interest with a lower risk of triggering the bias cascade, and
vice versa. Thus, in their decisions upholding universities’ pursuit of student body
diversity in Grutter and Fisher, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy noted that narrow
tailoring “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative”200 but only of those that are “workable.”201 They also showed deference in
evaluating the universities’ implementation efforts, which was promptly criticized
that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial
politics.”); id. at 516 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (arguing that apparent stereotyping
underlying remedial ordinance suggested the possibility that the ordinance was “nothing
more than a form of patronage . . . racial patronage”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 310 (plurality opinion) (approving remediation of societal discrimination as
compelling “would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights
into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to
whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination.”).
196
See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 515–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (arguing that
because the remedial ordinance was not limited to victims of prior discrimination and assumed
inappropriately that “every white contractor covered by the ordinance shares in [the] guilt”
of prior discrimination, there was “a special irony” in that the ordinance thus stigmatized White
people with the “unproven charge of past racial discrimination” and its beneficiaries with the perception that they “are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race”).
197
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
198
See supra Section I.C.4.
199
Croson, 488 U.S. at 510; cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280–81
(1986) (“As part of this Nation’s dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent
persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. ‘When effectuating
a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a
“sharing of the burden” by innocent parties is not impermissible.’”) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)).
200
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
201
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).
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by the more conservative Justices as an “abandoning” of strict scrutiny.202 Within
the approach, however, such deference makes sense. Since pursuing the diversity
interest generally tends to counteract the bias cascade and the government is less
likely to be a racial hostility perpetrator, it is appropriate to grant the government
deference unless it can be shown that the government did, in fact, fail to mitigate the
bias cascade through excessive or sloppy uses of race in a particular situation.203
Justice O’Connor’s decision to switch sides and strike down a race-conscious
admissions system in Gratz,204 the companion case to Grutter, is best explained by
her view that she saw the admissions program at issue—which gave an automatic,
and comparatively large, number of points to underrepresented minority applicants
in a process in which a certain number of points guaranteed admission205—as an
example of the latter. Some scholars have suggested that the deciding factor for
O’Connor may have been that the greater “opaqueness” of the program in Grutter
would lead to less balkanization.206 The antibalkanization logic set out above suggests
instead that what was critical for Justice O’Connor was that the use of race in Gratz
was “mechanical,” i.e., that it assigned the same amount of points to each minority
applicant in a way that was “automatic” and “predetermined.”207 The combination
of a large and automatic point award would communicate to (even a well-meaning)
white observer that the program was based on stereotyping, designed to ensure racial
minority applicants a “piece of the action,” and thus would kick off the bias cascade.208
Having their college experience framed by such an admissions system, students
would be likely to relate to each other in ways that perpetuated racial divisions and
a sense of antagonistic group competition, thus undermining rather than facilitating
the racial harmony necessary for progress toward racial equality. A holistic and more
flexible system as in Grutter, by contrast, would communicate that race was taken
202

Notably, in Grutter, this charge was made by Justice Kennedy himself. 539 U.S. at 387
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). As I suggest below, this could be partially explained by Justice
Kennedy’s willingness to soften his stance on race-conscious equality efforts at least somewhat over time. See infra Section I.F. In Fisher II, the charge was made by Justice Alito. 136
S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).
203
This was, in effect, Justice Kennedy’s charge in Grutter. Rather than objecting to the
use of race as such, Kennedy thought the record established that the university had “mask[ed]
its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances.” 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). Because this reflected the opposite of individualized review, i.e., governmental
stereotyping and racial politics, “[t]he unhappy consequence [would] be to perpetuate the
hostilities that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.” Id. at 394.
204
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 277 (2003).
205
Id. at 279–80.
206
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring after
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 569–70 (2007) (stating and criticizing this possibility);
Siegel, supra note 90, at 798–800 (describing argument as made by various scholars).
207
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280.
208
It would not much matter under the antibalkanization approach whether this was the
“actual predicate” of the program. See supra note 133.
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into account the same way that other characteristics were considered, i.e., when, and
to the extent that, it contributed to a productive learning environment. Because such
a process would create a productive forum for harmonious interaction between wellmeaning participants, it would be “taken in the service of the goal of equality itself”209
and whites “would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”210 Thus, it would make sense to provide some deference
to a university if it used a holistic program, but not if it used a “mechanical” one.
Similar considerations can explain why antibalkanization proponents have been
less deferential when race is used for remedial purposes.211 Indeed, the Court has not
upheld a remedial program since 1987.212 Superficially, this is curious because even
conservative Justices agree that remedying past discrimination and its effects is a
compelling (to them, perhaps the only compelling) government interest.213 Moreover,
this interest is most closely related to the troubling history of race that underwrites the
antibalkanization approach’s willingness to allow the government to consider race in
the first place.214 From the standpoint of managing the bias cascade and racial hostility
perpetrators, however, this lack of deference makes more sense. Remedying discrimination, especially when discrimination itself is understood from a perpetrator perspective that many Whites hold,215 requires judgments about discriminator/beneficiary
and victim status that Whites are likely to perceive as based on broad stereotypes and
stigmatic “unproven charges”216 absent specific evidence to the contrary. When the
209

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
Id. at 341.
211
Justice Stevens has been most explicit about this lack of deference, noting that “a
remedial justification for race-based legislation will almost certainly sweep too broadly.”
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 n.1 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 49 (“[T]he Court has made remedying racial discrimination
the most difficult basis for using affirmative action.”).
212
See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding judicially imposed racebased promotional quota in response to egregious discriminatory conduct by the Alabama
Department of Public Safety). Even in Paradise, Justice Powell concurred separately that his
vote was based on the limited nature of the race-conscious decree and its “relatively diffuse”
impact on “innocent white troopers.” Id. at 188–89. Justice O’Connor dissented based on her
view that the decree was based on inappropriate stereotyping and the district court’s refusal
to consider race-neutral alternatives. See id. at 197‚ 201.
213
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2014) (plurality opinion) (Past decisions recognize “the compelling interest of remedying
the effects of past intentional discrimination.”); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996) (“A
State’s interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the
proper case justify a government’s use of racial distinctions.”).
214
See supra Section I.C.1.
215
See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1126–31 (2008) (discussing disagreement between Whites and people of color about the
definition of discrimination and noting that Whites are likely to view racial discrimination as
“evident primarily when there is overt evidence of racial hostility”).
216
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
210
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government thus creates a process in which Whites and racial minorities interact
around a remedial aim, the approach’s logic suggests that the government is highly
likely to create a bias cascade that dead-ends in counterproductive racial conflict and
antagonism rather than racial harmony. This will occur unless the program at issue
is very carefully tailored to make clear that the government is, in fact, responding
only to clear instances of prior wrongdoing rather than using race as a rough proxy
and vehicle for racial politics.217
Judgments about the government as a racial hostility perpetrator, in other words,
pervade the antibalkanization approach’s use of strict scrutiny and its judgments
about the constitutionality of government race-consciousness under the Equal
Protection Clause.
E. Antibalkanization Approach Rex
When the above analysis is taken as a whole, one sees the result of a 40-year
jurisprudential effort to make concerns about racial balkanization central to constitutional racial equality jurisprudence. This effort has largely succeeded, driving not
only the choice of doctrinal tests but also the specifics of their implementation. The
opinions cited above as support for the different steps of the antibalkanization approach
have either become governing doctrine over time, remain good law today, or represent the leading opinions in areas where the Court is splintered. In the context of
affirmative action in higher education, for example, Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke which used antibalkanization concerns to justify the application of strict
scrutiny, the determination of which government interests were compelling, and how
a permissible program should be implemented, was reaffirmed first by the majority
opinion of Justice O’Connor in Grutter and most recently by Justice Kennedy in
Fisher.218 In the context of affirmative action in government contracting at the state
level, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Croson remains good law today. At the federal
level, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Fullilove animated further dissents by Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy in Metro Broadcasting that eventually found majority
217
This explains why antibalkanization proponents often focus on whether remedial programs provide waivers. Compare, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508
(1989) (rejecting remedial program in part because waivers would have provided a less rigidly
race-conscious alternative), with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (approving remedial program in part because the existing waiver provision prevented the program from being applied too “rigidly”).
218
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(“Disparate constitutional tolerance of [racial] classifications well may serve to exacerbate
racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 325 (2003) (plurality opinion); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013)
(taking Bakke and Grutter “as given for purposes of deciding this case” and relying on those
opinions in setting out legal principles to be considered by lower court remand); Fisher II,
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016) (relying on controlling principles from Fisher I in upholding
affirmative action program at issue).
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expression in Adarand, which essentially overruled both Fullilove and Metro
Broadcasting and remains good law today.219 In the voting rights/redistricting context,
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Shaw that relied on antibalkanization concerns in its
decision to permit White voters to bring a new type of constitutional claim challenging
racial gerrymandering was further developed in cases like Miller and Shaw v. Hunt
and remains good law today.220 In the context of public school desegregation, Justice
Kennedy’s separate concurrence in Parents Involved is currently the leading opinion
on the issue,221 as is Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Schuette in the context
of the “political process” doctrine.
F. Justices Willing to Learn (to Some Extent)
While the above analysis shows the consistency and influence of the antibalkanization approach, it does not quite yet show the aspect of the approach that
justifies a tepid judgment that it has some progressive potential: the approach appears
to appeal specifically to Justices with a certain willingness to take the reality of
continued racial inequality seriously beyond a priori ideological commitments, and
to learn about its complexities over time. To be sure, these Justices remain committed
to the basic antibalkanization logic throughout their career, and as I describe below,
this fact defines the regressive reality of the approach. At the same time, it is important
to uncover how antibalkanization proponents soften their application of that logic over
time. They start out with significantly more race conservative views—i.e., they are
significantly more hostile to race-conscious government efforts to address racial
inequality—and become more supportive of such efforts over time. This softening
seems to reflect not growing doubts about antibalkanization as the correct jurisprudential approach, but rather a growing sophistication and willingness to learn about
the intricacies of different steps of the bias cascade. It also represents the reason why
governmental race-consciousness in pursuit of racial equality remains permissible
in certain circumstances even though it has been assailed for decades by a powerful
camp of anticlassification proponents.
Perhaps the clearest example of this softening is Justice Stevens, who joined the
Court in 1975 and whose 1980 dissent in Fullilove became the go-to citation for later
Justices who (at earlier stages of their own career) relied on the antibalkanization
approach to demand significant limits on race-conscious government decisionmaking.222 Indeed, in her 1995 majority opinion in Adarand, Justice O’Connor
219

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227–28 (1995).
See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 802 (2017) (“The
Court’s holding in this case is controlled by precedent. The Court reaffirms the basic racial
predominance analysis explained in Miller and Shaw II.”).
221
Brennan-Marquez, supra note 45, at 778 (noting that Kennedy’s opinion “effectively
states the law”).
222
See supra Section I.C.4. Thus, Stevens’s Fullilove opinion is frequently cited above.
220
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liberally cited Stevens’ Fullilove dissent223 to ward off a strongly worded dissent by
Stevens himself, who charged that the majority’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to
a Congressional affirmative action program in contracting (a position that one could
read into Stevens’ Fullilove opinion) was the equivalent of “disregard[ing] the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”224 Notably, Stevens’s
switch was not based on a retraction of his Fullilove opinion or the general antibalkanization approach it contained.225 Rather, it was based on a more sophisticated
understanding that race is not always irrelevant and thus reliance on race need not
involve stereotyping by the government;226 that arguments about the potential stigma
imposed by affirmative action programs on minority beneficiaries, while a real
concern, had to be made in context and preferably by the allegedly stigmatized themselves rather than by Whites;227 and that in most affirmative action programs, there
is only an “indirect burden on the majority.”228 More generally, toward the end of his
career Justice Stevens had become a consistent vote on the Court supporting raceconscious racial equality interventions of various kinds in a way that someone reading
his opinions in the 1970s and early 1980s would not have been able to predict.229
A similar, though more muted, point can be made about Justice O’Connor
regarding her switch in votes between Metro Broadcasting and Grutter. In Metro,
O’Connor wrote a scathing dissent that was deeply steeped in a non-contextual
application of the antibalkanization logic that on first glance could have been taken
to embody an anticlassification sentiment.230 Notably, she rejected as “clearly not
a compelling interest” (indeed not even an important one) the government’s asserted
interest in increasing the diversity of broadcasting viewpoints because the pursuit
of such an interest could only lead to “generalizations impermissibly equating race
with thoughts and behavior.”231 She did so even though the majority opinion discussed empirical evidence suggesting that the program was not based on stereotyping and indeed was likely to counteract stereotyping of racial minorities and to
223

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228–31.
Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225
See id. at 258 (“I continue to believe that the Fullilove case was incorrectly decided.”).
226
See, e.g., id. at 261 (noting that the program was “designed to overcome the social and
economic disadvantages that are often associated with racial characteristics”); id. at 248 n.5
(“In enacting affirmative-action programs, a legislature intends to remove obstacles that have
unfairly placed individuals of equal qualifications at a competitive disadvantage.”).
227
Id. at 247 n.5 (arguing that “white-owned business” had no “standing to advance” a
stigma argument on behalf of minority beneficiaries and noting that “[n]o beneficiaries of the
specific program under attack today have challenged its constitutionality—perhaps because
they do not find the preferences stigmatizing”).
228
Id. at 253 n.7.
229
See also Haney López, supra note 30, at 1874–77 (lauding Stevens’s “exceptional
willingness to learn about racism . . . .”).
230
However, the steps of the antibalkanization approach are clearly visible when laid out
as above.
231
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 612–15 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
224
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provide wider access to important leadership positions.232 These are, of course, the
very arguments that O’Connor mobilized later on in her majority opinion in Grutter
to support the proposition that diversity was a compelling governmental interest in
university admissions.233 This proposition was by no means set in stone when Grutter
was decided234 and would have been rejected had O’Connor voted in line with her
intimations in Metro. While there are certainly many possible explanations for
O’Connor’s change in views, one plausible explanation is that it was based at least
in part on O’Connor’s willingness to learn and take seriously the large number of
sophisticated amicus briefs in Grutter. These briefs showed how pursuing racial
diversity via racial classifications was not necessarily an exercise in stereotyping or
racial politics; would not necessarily lead to the encouragement of stereotyping, stigmatization, and racial hostility and resentment; and instead reflected the careful
pursuit of important and real goals in a diverse society that remains deeply shaped
by race.235 This switch was available to O’Connor from within the antibalkanization
approach and seemed to reflect her sentiment that based on the university’s careful
efforts to bring students together across racial lines rather than to divide them, the
government had overcome its presumptive racial hostility perpetrator status.
Justice Kennedy’s switch to upholding a university affirmative action program
in Fisher was perhaps even more surprising. He had dissented in both prior
diversity-related cases, Metro and Grutter.236 There was also a clear opportunity to
reject the particular program in Fisher, had Kennedy been so inclined, on the basis
that the “Top Ten Percent Plan” that governed most admissions decisions at the
university produced sufficient racial diversity.237 But Kennedy voted to uphold the
program.238 To be sure, he warned that racial classifications could not be used in a
232

Id. at 581–82 (majority opinion).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332–33 (2003) (praising affirmative action program
for providing visibly open access to training for important leadership positions and for
helping diminish racial stereotypes).
234
Indeed, it had been explicitly rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996).
235
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–33 (discussing amicus briefs). Justice O’Connor’s move
over time toward a more complex understanding of the operation of race in American society
is arguably also reflected by her decision to switch from the bloc of Justices that had consistently rejected race-conscious redistricting efforts after O’Connor’s own opinion in Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) to join the majority opinion by Justice Breyer in Easley v. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234 (2001). Easley overturned a “predominant factor” finding by the lower court as
clearly erroneous based on an arguably more nuanced understanding of the relationships between race, party identification, and politics than the prior post-Shaw cases had displayed;
see also Haney López, supra note 30, at 1862 n.371 (noting O’Connor’s shift in Easley).
236
Indeed, the dissent in Fisher seemed to go out of its way to cite Kennedy’s own opinions
in prior cases dealing with governmental race-consciousness. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct.
2198, 2220–22 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
237
See id. at 2211–12 (majority opinion) (noting but rejecting this argument).
238
Id. at 2214–15.
233
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“divisive manner” and otherwise cabined the reach of the case.239 But he seemed
more willing than in prior cases to accept that the university, after a careful review240
which had identified clear problems of racial isolation and feelings of loneliness
among minority students,241 had used racial classifications in a way that was not
based on mere stereotypes and instead would help to counter them and provide the
kind of forum in which well-meaning people would interact harmoniously and in
ways that would further the goal of substantive equal opportunity.242
There are a few important takeaways from these examples. First, the examples
illustrate how the antibalkanization approach is not reducible to either anticlassification
or antisubordination and that it is analytically useful to parse out its logic in terms
of the bias cascade. More importantly, these examples illustrate that the approach
speaks to Justices who are not disingenuous about their stated intentions to take the
continued reality of racial inequality seriously and who are willing to learn about it
to some extent. This internal growth dimension has preserved some space for raceconscious racial equality efforts that would otherwise no longer be available. Antibalkanization proponents voted for such efforts in situations where they were not constrained to do so by their prior jurisprudence and could expect to be heavily criticized
(often in their own words) by their colleagues. There is progressive potential in a
jurisprudence that allows its proponents to prioritize intellectual engagement over
ideology in those ways. In this way, at least, antibalkanization proponents have prevented constitutional law from becoming a simple vehicle for “intentional blindness”
toward racial inequality.243
At the same time, it is important to emphasize the limits of these points. For one,
the space carved out for race-conscious equality programs by the above examples is
slim and perpetually precarious.244 Even in higher education, where antibalkanization
239

See id. at 2209 (noting the “artificial basis” upon which the case was litigated because
the plaintiff did not challenge the Top Ten Percent plan and that this “may limit [the decision’s]
value for prospective guidance”).
240
Id. at 2211 (noting a “thoughtful review” by the university before implementing the
race-conscious program).
241
Id. at 2212.
242
Id. at 2211 (accepting as “concrete and precise” the university’s goals of pursuing “the
destruction of stereotypes, the promotion of cross-racial understanding, the preparation of
a student body for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and the cultivat[ion of] a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry”). Similar to Justice O’Connor,
Justice Kennedy also seemed to soften somewhat in his redistricting jurisprudence later in
his career. For example, he joined Justice Breyer’s opinion for a slim five-Justice majority
in Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015), which allowed some discretion
in race-conscious redistricting for legislatures as part of narrow tailoring; and he wrote the
majority opinion himself in Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017),
which applied this discretion to uphold a race-conscious district.
243
See generally Haney López, supra note 30.
244
The next challenge to affirmative action in higher education is already before the court.
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decisions have most clearly preserved the possibility for affirmative action, Justice
Kennedy’s decision in Schuette mobilized the antibalkanization logic to uphold an
anti-affirmative action referendum because he believed that the democratic process
that produced it represented the kind of well-meaning debate and decision-making
in pursuit of racial equality (just in the form of a prohibition on affirmative action)
that the approach wants to call forth.245 This conclusion was not only problematic
on the facts of that case,246 but it also facilitates future challenges to affirmative action
programs at universities.247
Furthermore, while the examples illustrate a willingness to grow within the
antibalkanization approach, they do not show a willingness to question its fundamental baseline assumptions and its perpetrator perspective. Justice Stevens’ progression over time shows how much change true willingness to learn about the
complexities of race can generate, but it also shows the limits of containing such
willingness within a perpetrator perspective. Stevens never repudiated his dissent
in Fullilove, thus making it easier for its strong language to be mobilized restrictively later by those with a similarly limited vision of racial inequality as his own
at the time. More importantly, even later in his career, Stevens did not relinquish the
approach’s basic “skepticism” toward racial classifications248 and reiterated his
conviction that remedial reliance on race was especially likely to be inappropriate.249
In this regard, it is important to remember that while by the mid-1980s Justice
Stevens had made clear his willingness to accept forward-looking uses of race,250 he
See supra note 57. More broadly, the softening of views described here appears to have become
less substantial with Justices appointed later in time. As Russell Robinson has shown, for
example, Justice Kennedy’s overall constitutional jurisprudence in race cases is predominantly race-conservative. Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151,
198–204 (2016) (Empirical study of Kennedy’s votes in constitutional cases dealing with
claims based on race, sex, and sexual orientation between 1988 and 2015 shows that in nonunanimous cases Kennedy’s votes can be described as “liberal” in only one-third of the cases).
245
Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 314 (2014) (noting that
“[t]he electorate’s instruction to governmental entities not to embark upon the course of racedefined and race-based preferences was adopted, we must assume, because the voters
deemed a preference system to be unwise, on account of what voters may deem its latent
potential to become itself a source of the very resentments and hostilities based on race that
this Nation seeks to put behind it”).
246
See generally Samuel Weiss & Donald Kinder, Schuette and Antibalkanization, 26
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 693 (2017) (demonstrating empirically that proponents of
referendum were motivated by racial resentment, not by desire for social cohesion).
247
For a broader critique of Schuette, see Robinson, supra note 244, at 215–26.
248
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed,
notwithstanding his otherwise strongly worded dissent in Adarand, Stevens “welcome[d the]
renewed endorsement” of this skepticism. Id.
249
See, e.g., Parents Involved Cmty. Schls. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 800
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting)

2022]

HOPE DIES LAST

659

voted to strike down the remedial affirmative action program in Croson in 1989 in
full reliance on the antibalkanization logic.251 He also joined the portion of Justice
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Croson which denied that there was a sufficient
evidentiary basis for the program at issue by disaggregating a compelling mosaic of
devastating minority under-representation in the local construction industry into a
series of individual pieces and repudiating each piece separately without acknowledging their interrelation.252 Croson, in turn, became the basis for the extension of strict
scrutiny to federal remedial legislation in Adarand.253 The resulting doctrinal landscape
ensures that today, no matter what the level of government and the perceived urgency
for enacting a remedial race-based program, decisionmakers will think twice before
implementing such a program and inviting an inevitable (likely fatal) lawsuit.254
Shining through even Stevens’ journey to the progressive edges of the antibalkanization approach, then, is a commitment to the traditional perpetrator perspective baseline view255 of American democracy: well-meaning whites are willing to
participate in well-crafted racial equality programs and respond with hostility and
resentment to governmental race-consciousness not because of a vested interest in
the status quo of racial stratification, but because they have been prodded to do so
by sloppy government work. To exaggerate perhaps a little, this is a view under which
we would all be better served if we just “got over the past,” set aside the difficulties
and hostilities that come with working out how much the past has affected the
present, and worried only about what positive things we can accomplish together in
the future.
A desire to work together harmoniously for a better future is, of course, appropriate. But as Part II suggests, simply expecting this to unfold in a society deeply
grounded in racial hierarchy is to pretend to be living in a different world than the
one that actually exists. Focusing less on race because doing so may stimulate racial
hostility and resentment may well be logical in the world as assumed by the antibalkanization approach. However, it is neither logical nor productive in the world
(“Rather than analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers have some
sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I
believe that we should first ask whether the Board’s action advances the public interest in
educating children for the future.”).
251
See generally Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511–20 (1989).
252
Id. at 498–506.
253
Even in his Adarand dissent, Stevens noted that the Congressional program at issue
was acceptable to him because while perhaps “in part a remedy for past discrimination,” it
was “most importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by minority
subcontractors.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 261–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254
Moreover, by suggesting that remedial uses of race are the least likely to be appropriate,
these decisions fortify the self-perception of White people as presumptively innocent of any
involvement in or benefit from the troubling history of race that antibalkanization Justices
are willing to acknowledge in the abstract. See Simson, supra note 136, at 693–94.
255
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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that actually is. Based on this disconnect, the antibalkanization approach downplays
and discourages a focus on the continuing influence of white supremacy in everyday
life and makes it more difficult to address this influence through law.256 This is the
regressive reality of the antibalkanization approach.
II. ANTIBALKANIZATION ACTUALITIES—RACIAL HIERARCHY AND THE
STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT
Absent from the antibalkanization approach’s perpetrator-perspective-based
explanation of what causes racial hostility and resentment among whites is the
elephant in the room: America’s long-standing racial hierarchy that is grounded in
notions of white supremacy. The regressive reality of the approach can be traced to
the fact that it overlooks the structural influence of this hierarchy on racial dynamics
generally, and on white racial hostility and resentment specifically. In this hierarchy,
whites, as a group, continue to occupy a preferred position across all important
aspects of social life257 and the privileges of whiteness confer important psychic and
status benefits to all who can access them,258 regardless of how privileged they may
be on other indicators.259 As a result, whites as a group have a deep-seated interest
256

My use of the term “white supremacy” reflects a broad and structural definition,
summarized powerfully by Frances Lee Ansley:
By ‘white supremacy’ I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious
racism of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political,
economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control
power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of
white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white
dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a
broad array of institutions and social settings . . . . The term ‘white
supremacy’ is emphatically not used here to inflate rhetoric, or to deny
that some forms of white supremacy are more virulent than others . . . .
On the other hand, I fail to see how Americans can avoid recognizing
that we still live in a white supremacist system.
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
257
See, e.g., Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science: Why and How Difference Makes a Difference, 21 PSYCH. INQUIRY 77, 79–80 (2010) (giving examples related to wealth and employment,
criminal justice, education, and health).
258
See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 2007). The classic reference that such benefits
constitute a kind of “public and psychological wage” of Whiteness that has long hindered the
development of racial solidarity is W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA
700 (1935) (The Free Press 1998).
259
L. Taylor Phillips & Brian S. Lowery, The Hard-Knock Life? Whites Claim Hardships
in Response to Racial Inequity, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 12, 12 (2015) (“Whites
enjoy privileges due to their race, regardless of the difficulty or ease of their particular life
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in maintaining this racial hierarchy.260 This Part argues that this interest in protecting
a dominant hierarchy position, and responding to a perception of threats to it, are the
most likely sources of white racial hostility and resentment in response to government racial equality efforts—not a bias cascade that is triggered by the government
using race “too much.”261 Social science research from numerous contexts supports
this argument.
A. Racial Hierarchy and Threats in the Social Psychology of Race
Social scientists have found the concept of racial hierarchy crucial for accurately
describing race relations and the social psychology of race in the United States. For
example, Social Dominance Theory (SDT) has built a broad research program
around explaining the mechanisms by which group-based hierarchies—of which
racial hierarchy is the most prominent example262—develop and remain remarkably
stable over time.263 Among the important and consistent findings of SDT is that
members of dominant racial groups (including whites in the United States), on the
whole, “will be more supportive of group-based hierarchy than . . . racial minorities,”264 in large part because the re-creation of group-based hierarchy is most in
their self-interest.265 As a result, they are more likely to engage in a wide range of
behaviors, have policy preferences, stereotypes, and attitudes, and support ideologies that are likely to maintain or enhance existing racial hierarchy.266 In other
words, because white Americans benefit from America’s racial hierarchy, they are
motivated to protect it. Most importantly for this Article, a number of studies in the
circumstances. Whites suffer hardships, and sometimes greater hardships than particular
minorities; however, Whites’ non-racial hardships are irrelevant to racial privilege.”).
260
See, e.g., Cho, supra note 109, at 122 (“Logically, . . . whites have a vested interest in
retaining advantageous racial hierarchies, structures and cultures—the property value of
whiteness—and may be expected to defend political and material advantages over peoples
of color.”). The relevance for law of social science research describing this social dominance
interest has improperly been ignored by most legal scholarship and should be analyzed in
greater depth. See generally Simson, supra note 35.
261
See also Bartlett, supra note 24 (exploring role of threat in explaining why current law
is more hostile to race-based than to gender-based affirmative action programs).
262
JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 61 (1999) (“[F]or most of U.S. history, race . . . has
been and remains the primary basis of social stratification.”).
263
For a detailed discussion of Social Dominance Theory and related research, as well as
an application to employment discrimination doctrine, see Simson, supra note 35.
264
Id. at 1050. In the terminology of SDT, this means that they have a higher “social
dominance orientation” (SDO), which is an individual difference variable that measures
people’s relative support and preference for group inequality and for social systems to be
structured as group-based hierarchies. Id. at 1048–49.
265
Id. at 1057–58.
266
See generally id. at 1047–62.
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SDT tradition suggest that white Americans become especially protective of racial
hierarchy when it is perceived to be under threat.267 While SDT is not specifically
focused on the role of threats in race relations, its findings on the connection between hierarchy threats and hierarchy-protective behavior of white Americans are
consistent with the predictions of other sociological and social psychological theories
that are more directly concerned with the role of threat.
For example, according to group position theory, race relations, and in particular
the attitudes and behavior of whites vis-à-vis racial minorities, are driven to a significant extent by a sense of dominant group position.268 In this view, the behavior and
views of whites, the dominant group, are influenced not only by feelings of white
superiority, ideas about minorities as different and alien, and white claims to priority
access to certain rights, resources, and status, but also by “a perception of threat from
members of a subordinate group who harbor a desire for a greater share of dominant
group members’ prerogatives.”269 When whites perceive such a threat to their group
position, they will often react with fear, apprehension, anger, and resentment and act
to protect their dominant group position.270
Even more specifically, intergroup threat theory has developed a comprehensive
account of the ways in which different kinds of threats affect intergroup relations,
including race relations.271 According to this theory, there are both “realistic threats,”
which “refer to concerns about physical harm or a loss of power and/or resources”;272
and “symbolic threats,” which “refer . . . to [] concern[s] about the integrity or validity
of the ingroup’s meaning system.”273 Both types of threats play the important role
267

See, e.g., Eric D. Knowles et al., On the Malleability of Ideology: Motivated Construals
of Color Blindness, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 857 (2009) (explaining how under
threat, White people with higher preferences for group-based hierarchy construe colorblindness
as procedural justice rather than distributive justice mandate because doing so protects
existing hierarchy to a greater extent); Kimberly Rios Morrison & Oscar Ybarra, The Effects
of Realistic Threat and Group Identification on Social Dominance Orientation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 156 (2008) (finding that under threat, White people can exhibit
higher levels of hierarchy preference).
268
See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo, Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a
Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 445 (1999).
269
Id. at 449.
270
Id. at 450; see also Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct
and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1096–1109 (2002) (relying on SDT and group
position theory, as well as social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory in analyzing
race relations as a form of intergroup competition).
271
See, e.g., Walter G. Stephan, Oscar Ybarra & Kimberly Rios, Intergroup Threat Theory,
in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 255 (2d ed. 2015).
272
Id. at 257.
273
Id. at 256. Both realistic and symbolic threats, moreover, exist both at the individual
and at the group level, so that in total the theory posits “four basic types of intergroup threat:
realistic group threats, symbolic group threats, realistic individual threats, and symbolic individual threats.” Id. at 258.
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of mediating how different aspects of existing relationships between racial groups,
including differences in “group power, relative status, group size, and prior intergroup conflict” can lead to negative intergroup outcomes, including whites experiencing negative emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment;274 whites endorsing
negative stereotypes of racial minorities as well as negative attitudes toward them
and policies meant to benefit them;275 and whites engaging in negative behavior such
as discrimination against racial minorities.276
Taken together, these research projects suggest that the behavior, feelings, and
emotions of whites with regard to the distribution of societal resources is driven to
a significant extent by a combination of the desire to protect their dominant position
in the existing racial hierarchy and the sense of threat to this dominant position that
whites experience in a given situation.277
At first glance, these points may seem mundane and self-evident. But on closer
inspection, they undermine the basic foundations of the antibalkanization approach—and thus of current equal protection law on race-conscious governmental
equality efforts. For one, they call into question the approach’s baseline view that
most white Americans can generally be assumed to be well-meaning participants in
shared efforts to accomplish greater racial equality so long as those efforts are
properly structured by the government. After all, if white Americans as a group are
motivated to protect racial hierarchy and ward off threats to it, it seems equally, if
not more, reasonable to assume that the default response to progress toward racial
equality will be resistance rather than cooperation.278 Moreover, if it is the loss of
274

Id. at 264.
Id. at 269–70.
276
Id. at 271.
277
See, e.g., Nour S. Kteily & Kaylene J. McClanahan, Incorporating Insights About
Intergroup Power and Dominance to Help Increase Harmony and Equality Between Groups
in Conflict, 33 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 80, 81 (2020) (noting that “[f]aced with threat to the
status quo, advantaged group members adopt a series of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors
that bolster the hierarchy” and providing illustrations); Ryan M. Quist & Miriam G. Resendez,
Social Dominance Threat: Examining Social Dominance Theory’s Explanation of Prejudice
as Legitimizing Myths, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 287 (2002) (interaction of social
dominance orientation and four different measures of threat predicted White stereotypical
beliefs and prejudicial attitudes toward Black people).
278
This is not meant to be a simplistic point that White Americans are “bad people” or
riven by racial animus. From a critical perspective, it seems “understandable” that many
White people would have the described sentiments given basic self-interest and the history
and power relations of race in the United States. Members of other groups in dominant positions often also exhibit similar hierarchy-related interests. See, e.g., Kteily & McClanahan,
supra note 277, at 80 (“Despite individual variability, advantaged groups are typically more
supportive of hierarchy, threatened by changes to the status quo, and motivated to protect the
privileges associated with their continued dominance.”). But regardless of whether they are
“understandable” or not, the social psychological findings discussed in this Part are inconsistent
with the assumptions of the antibalkanization approach and thus must be taken seriously in
275
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race-based status and position in the racial hierarchy as such that is threatening to
whites and causes stereotyping, anger, hostility, and resentment, it would seem erroneous to attach as much significance as the antibalkanization approach does to
whether race is being used too much or too explicitly in a particular government
intervention. After all, even interventions that don’t explicitly rely on race as well
as broad changes in race relations generally should be expected to cause the same
sentiments so long as they are perceived to be threatening the racial hierarchy.279 The
following sections show how this indeed seems to be the case.
I discuss two different sets of research. The first set on the anticipated demographic shift of the United States from a majority-white to a “majority-minority”
nation and related studies on “racial progress” shows that it does not take raceconscious intervention by the government at all to generate white racial hostility and
resentment. Rather, it takes a threat to, and perceived possible interference with, the
dominant hierarchy status of whites. This is so even if this threat is fairly impersonal, non-individualized, and still quite far off into the future. The second set of
research shows that even when race-conscious government action in pursuit of
greater racial equality is involved, white racial hostility and resentment is to a significant extent a response to hierarchy-related threats, not to whether the government
used race “too much.”
B. Racial Threat, Hostility, and Resentment Without Government Action:
Research on the “Majority-Minority Nation” and Racial Progress
In 2008, the Census Bureau projected that by the middle of the twenty-first
century the United States would move from a majority-white to a “majority-minority”
nation.280 I refer to this projection as the “majority-minority shift.” In a country in
the analysis of racial equality law. This is not, and should not be, an exercise in racial essentialism. See supra note 21. My discussion is not meant to suggest, and social science research
would not support, that all White Americans will automatically think and behave in a particular
way. But there are patterns in thought and behavior that social science has shown to be connected to racial group membership in important ways and that must be considered carefully.
279
Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights
after Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2864–65 (2014) (questioning universal accuracy of argument “that if a law specifically treats people differently based on their group status . . .
then it will send the message that group status matters, but if a law is not specifically framed
in group-based or targeted terms, then it will not send such a message” because while plausible,
“it is just as plausible that many laws will have a social meaning that does not turn on such
formalities,” for example because “the public understands universalist approaches as really
focusing their benefits on particular groups” even if this is not done in explicit terms).
280
Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, More Diverse Yet Less Tolerant? How the
Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape Affects White Americans’ Racial Attitudes, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 750, 750 (2014). This projection remains current. See Jonathan
Vespa, Lauren Median & David M. Armstrong, DEMOGRAPHIC TURNING POINTS FOR THE
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which citizenship was for long periods explicitly restricted to Whites,281 and in which
immigration has also often been heavily regulated by race in favor of White ethnic
groups,282 the projection of such a shift was a major development. A detailed social
science research program has developed to investigate its consequences. Of particular importance to this Article, this research program has uncovered that making
whites aware of the shift creates a perceived threat to whites’ dominant position in
the existing racial hierarchy.283 In turn, the experience of this threat leads Whites to
respond in numerous ways that might protect their position—including bias, hostility, anger, and resentment toward other racial groups.
At the most basic level, researchers have found that when whites are told about
the majority-minority shift, they express greater racial bias, both explicit and implicit, against racial minorities. Thus, in a set of studies by Craig and Richeson,
Whites who were told about the shift expressed greater preferences for their own
racial group and discomfort with other racial groups on an explicit survey, and greater
implicit bias against racial minorities on the Implicit Association Test, compared to
control populations.284 Importantly, the authors found that it was the perceived threat
to their societal status that explained whites’ greater expression of racial bias toward
racial minorities when exposed to the demographic shift information.285
In isolation, this result might suggest that finding out about an increase in the
racial minority population might simply reflect an increase in the perceived salience
of racial minorities, leading to a strengthening of pre-existing biases and negative
UNITED STATES THE UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU 7, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www
.census.gov/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.html [https://perma.cc/S5KA-YR3B]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
281
See Simson, supra note 136, at 641 n.30.
282
See, e.g., Cho, supra note 109, at 87 and n.64 (collecting sources).
283
See, e.g., Craig & Richeson, supra note 280, at 752 (conceptualizing demographic shift
as creating “group status threat”). Different studies have named and conceptualized the
threats involved somewhat differently, but in general the conceptualizations revolve around
a threat to the dominant position of Whites in the existing racial hierarchy. See also H. Robert
Outten et al., Majority Group Members’ Negative Reactions to Future Demographic Shifts
Depend on the Perceived Legitimacy of Their Status: Findings from the United States and
Portugal, 9 FRONT. PSYCH. (2018) (conceptualizing threat involved as “intergroup threat”);
Felix Danbold & Yuen J. Huo, No Longer “All-American”? Whites’ Defensive Reactions to
Their Numerical Decline, 6 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 210 (2015) (conceptualizing
threats as “prototypicality threat” as well as realistic and symbolic threats).
284
Craig & Richeson, supra note 280, at 752–54; see also Allison L. Skinner & Jacob E.
Cheadle, The “Obama Effect”? Priming Contemporary Racial Milestones Increases Implicit
Racial Bias among Whites, 34 SOC. COGNITION 544, 548–49 (2016) (finding greater antiBlack implicit bias among Whites after being primed with majority-minority shift).
285
Craig & Richeson, supra note 280, at 757; see also Maureen A.Craig & Jennifer A.
Richeson, More Diverse Yet Less Tolerant? How the Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape
Affects White Americans’ Racial Attitudes, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 750 (2014)
(reporting updated results after discovering weighting errors in original studies but reconfirming
role of group status threat as only significant mediator for bias findings).
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evaluations of these groups independent of concerns for the position of Whites in the
racial hierarchy. However, additional research shows that this is not the case. Becoming aware of the majority-minority shift not only increases negative evaluations of
racial minorities, it also increases positive evaluations of whites and concerns about
their future position in American society.286 This suggests that what drives the reaction of Whites to this fundamental change in the structure of American society is not
simply negative feelings or stereotypes about racial minorities in the abstract that are
triggered in response to their projected growth in numbers. Rather, the reaction of
whites to this shift represents an effort to respond to a threat to the dominant position
of whites in the existing racial hierarchy and a desire to protect that position.
For example, research has found that making Whites aware of the majorityminority shift leads Whites to expect higher levels of anti-White discrimination in
the future,287 indeed possibly leading Whites to expect “that antiwhite discrimination
in the future would be strikingly more than in the present.”288 Going against the
assumptions of the antibalkanization approach, moreover, whites in these studies
expected greater anti-White discrimination in the future even if they were told that
in a future majority-minority nation “individuals and institutions will not consider
racial category information” in their distributive decisions.289 Threat to the dominant
position of whites in the racial hierarchy appeared to play an important role in driving
these reactions. Interestingly, the threat that seemed to be driving whites’ concern
about future anti-white discrimination was not a threat to their dominance in material
status, such as in terms of income and wealth, but rather a threat to their dominant
cultural position as the prototypical representative of American culture—what researchers have termed “prototypicality threat.”290 When told that in the future
majority-minority America minorities would “appreciate and conform to the mainstream culture,” Whites no longer expected greater anti-white discrimination.291
This is consistent with other research findings that “prototypicality threat” leads
whites who either perceive, or are told about, white population decreases in the
future to express significantly greater support for the idea that racial minorities
286

Craig & Richeson, supra note 280, at 757.
See Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, Majority No More? The Influence of
Neighborhood Racial Diversity and Salient National Population Changes on Whites’
Perceptions of Racial Discrimination, 4 RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 141 (2018);
Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, Information about the US Racial Demographic
Shift Triggers Concerns about Anti-White Discrimination Among the Prospective White
“Minority,” 12 PLOS ONE (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5617190/
[https://perma.cc/M3UH-EJFU].
288
Craig & Richeson, supra note 287, at 152.
289
Craig & Richeson, supra note 287, at 11.
290
Id. at 13. This is consistent with the idea that White supremacy has both material and
cultural dimensions, see supra note 256, and that threats to White racial status and position
in the racial hierarchy can be both material and symbolic. See supra notes 269, 271–72.
291
Craig & Richeson, supra note 287, at 14–15.
287
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should assimilate to the mainstream culture (a culture currently dominated and
represented prototypically by Whites); and to express significantly lower endorsement for the idea that racial diversity should be valued and encouraged.292 Similarly,
researchers have found that telling whites about the majority-minority shift leads
them to express greater sympathy toward their own racial group (but not toward
racial minorities),293 and that this increased sympathy is a function of, and response
to, perceived intergroup threat.294 Moreover, the threat of increasing demographic
diversity appears to affect the political preferences of whites and shift them in a
more racially conservative direction as well.295
Finally, and of most direct application for this Article, multiple studies have
found that exposing whites to a decline in their numerical majority status in the
future leads such whites to exhibit greater anger and fear toward minorities, and that
this relationship is connected to a significant extent to perceptions of threat. In
separate studies in 2012 and 2018, Outten and colleagues found that exposing white
Americans to information about the majority-minority shift led those whites to express
significantly more anger and fear toward racial minorities than whites in a control
group.296 Moreover, the 2018 studies confirmed what was only an indirect prediction
292

Danbold & Huo, supra note 283, at 213–16.
H. Robert Outten et al., Feeling Threatened About the Future: Whites’ Emotional
Reactions to Anticipated Ethnic Demographic Changes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 14, 16–17 (2012).
294
Id. at 20. In this research project, the mediating role of intergroup threat (measured as
perceptions of threat as well as perceptions of loss of influence generated by increased diversity)
was only measured in the second of two studies, which used White Canadian subjects, and not
in the first study, which used White American subjects. Id. at 16. However, given the generally
identical nature of the relevant findings, and the general role of threats in driving White
Americans’ reactions to demographic decline discussed in this section, it is fair to assume
that a similar mediating role of threat underlies the results in the American sample as well.
295
In relation to the 2016 election, for example, Major and colleagues found that exposing
White people to the majority-minority shift increased perceived group status threat, and that
group status threat served as a mediator explaining greater positivity toward, and likelihood of
voting for, Donald Trump, greater support for anti-immigration policies, and greater opposition to political correctness for White people who were highly identified with their Whiteness.
Brenda Major, Alison Blodorn & Gregory Major Blascovich, The Threat of Increasing Diversity: Why Many White Americans Support Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election, 21
GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGRP. RELS. 931, 934–37 (2018); see also Diana C. Mutz, Status
threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote, 115 PNAS E4330 (2018).
Researchers have also found different types of threats to the racial status of White people to
predict racial resentment and consequent support for the conservative “Tea Party” movement.
See Robb Willer, Matthew Feinberg & Rachel Wetts, THREATS TO RACIAL STATUS PROMOTE
TEA PARTY SUPPORT AMONG WHITE AMERICANS (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=277
0186 [https://perma.cc/Y3AB-9438].
296
See Outten et al., supra note 283, at 6–7 (2018 study); Outten et al., supra note 293
(2012 study). In both studies, “anger” was conceptualized as a composite measure of feelings
of anger, annoyance, and resentment.
293
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in the 2012 studies297: that perceptions of intergroup threat and increased amounts
of anger and fear toward minorities go together when whites consider the implications
of their predicted numerical decline. Whites exposed to the majority-minority shift
perceived both larger amounts of intergroup threat298 and felt an increased amount
of anger and fear toward minorities, though only if they perceived the current status
of whites as legitimate.299 Summing up their 2012 studies, the authors concluded:
[T]he results of these two studies provide convincing evidence
that merely thinking about impending ethnic demographic changes
can have important psychological consequences for Whites in
North America. . . . [G]rowing ethnic diversity is experienced as
threatening to Whites, and this heightened sense of threat can
increase negative feelings toward ethnic minorities and increase
the degree to which Whites identify with their race and feel
sympathy toward their ingroup.300
These dynamics, moreover, are not limited to the particular demography-related
threats represented by the majority-minority shift. Similar research that has investigated the reaction of white Americans to racial “milestones,” or indications of racial
progress in general, confirms the above patterns. For example, research by Wilkins
and colleagues found a similar effect on whites’ perceptions of anti-white discrimination as that discussed above when the threat to the dominant status of whites was
represented by perceptions of racial progress in general.301 In their study, both
whites who independently perceived there to be greater racial progress302 and whites
who were told about racial progress as part of the experiment303 perceived greater
297

Similar to the point noted above regarding sympathy, see supra note 294 and accompanying text., in their 2012 studies, Outten and colleagues did not investigate the role of
threat in their American sample, but did find that threat mediated the increased levels of anger
in the Canadian sample. Outten et al., supra note 293, at 20.
298
Intergroup threat was operationalized in this study as a combination of worry about the
future place of White people in the United States, threats experienced by growing diversity,
and ideas that White people will not benefit from growing diversity. Outten et al., supra note
283, at 4.
299
Because the focus of the 2018 study was on the role of perceived status legitimacy as
a moderator of anger, fear, and threat, the authors did not conduct a separate analysis of intergroup threat as a mediator of the relationship between reading about White numerical decline
and expressions of anger and fear. Outten et al., supra note 283, at 2.
300
Outten et al., supra note 293, at 23.
301
Clara L. Wilkins & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Racial Progress as Threat to the Status Hierarchy:
Implications for Perceptions of Anti-White Bias, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 439 (2014).
302
Participants rated their agreement with various items such as whether Black people are
now better off than before, and whether the election of the first Black president showed
strides toward racial equality. Id. at 441.
303
Participants “read about high-status racial minorities in traditionally White positions
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levels of anti-white bias in society304 so long as they believed in the legitimacy of
the current social system.305 While the authors did not directly measure whether
racial progress specifically represented a threat to such whites, they found that
affirming the participants’ sense of self (and thus alleviating a possible threat to the
sense of self) eliminated the effect of racial progress on perceived anti-white bias.306
Thus, they concluded that their results were “consistent with the perspective that racial
progress is threatening to individuals with stronger [system-legitimacy] endorsement
and that this threat corresponds to greater perceptions of anti-White bias.”307 In a
follow-up study, Wilkins and colleagues moreover found that exposure to racial
progress threatens whites’ sense of self as measured implicitly via indications of
self-worth.308 Similarly, research by Skinner and Cheadle found that exposing whites
to threats to their political power by priming the historic importance of the election
of Barack Obama led Whites to exhibit greater implicit bias against Black people,309
just like exposure to the majority-minority shift did in other studies.
This social science research strongly suggests that what ultimately drives negative reactions by whites to potential changes in race relations, including anger and
resentment toward racial minorities, is an acute sense of dominant group position
in America’s racial hierarchy and perceptions of threat to this position and its
privileges—including by impersonal forces such as demographic changes or broad
notions of “racial progress.” This suggests that in adopting a perpetrator perspective,
the antibalkanization approach underestimates the structural influence and power of
the interests that a long-standing social regime of racial hierarchy based on an ideology of white supremacy creates and nurtures. It also suggests that the approach
misunderstands how much progress toward substantive equal opportunity can be
achieved by trying to avoid white racial resentment and hostility through requirements that equality interventions don’t focus “too much” on race. Additional research
connecting white racial hostility and resentment more directly to government programs that benefit racial minorities further supports this claim.
(e.g., Barack Obama, Condoleezza Rice) and further read that social mobility is generalized
to racial minorities in the United States (e.g., progress in college enrollment and income).”
Id. at 442.
304
Participants rated their agreement with various items such as whether prejudice and
discrimination against White people was on the rise, and whether reverse racism was pervasive. Id. at 441.
305
Id. at 441–43.
306
Id. at 444.
307
Id.
308
Clara L. Wilkins et al., The Threat of Racial Progress and the Self-Protective Nature
of Perceiving Anti-White Bias, 20 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGRP. RELS. 801, 808 (2017)
(finding that study results are “consistent with our argument that racial progress threatens the
status hierarchy and thus, Whites—who traditionally occupy dominant positions in society”).
309
Skinner & Cheadle, supra note 284, at 548–49.
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C. Racial Threat, Hostility, and Resentment, and Government Actions in Pursuit
of Racial Equality
Research that investigates the views and reactions of whites to actual racial
equality programs also suggests that racial hierarchy, and perceived threats to the
dominant position of whites within it, are the key drivers of white racial hostility and
resentment related to such programs—not the extent to which race is invoked as
such. This is illustrated both by research on programs that explicitly consider race
as a factor—such as affirmative action programs—and programs that are perceived
as primarily benefitting racial minorities without explicitly relying on race—such
as welfare programs.310
With respect to affirmative action programs, a useful starting point for analysis
is that there is an “American racial hierarchy in views of affirmative action.”311 That
is, the views of members of different racial groups on whether affirmative action
programs are likely to have negative societal effects, and their relative levels of
support for the practice, tend to track the general position of those groups in the
racial hierarchy of the United States: Whites consistently evaluate affirmative action
most negatively and support it least, Black Americans evaluate it least negatively
and support it most, and Latinx and Asian Americans are usually somewhere inbetween.312 This relationship persists even if other explanatory variables for views
on affirmative action (for example, general conservatism or individualism) are taken
into account,313 and generally widens as affirmative action programs become “stronger” in nature (i.e., use race more decisively) and thus more directly intervene in
existing resource and status allocations.314 In other words, when it comes to views
on affirmative action as a general matter, “race matters,”315 those who have most to
310

Cf. Lawrence Bobo, Race, Interests, and Beliefs About Affirmative Action: Unanswered
Questions and New Directions, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 985, 999–1000 (1998) (“[A]ffirmative action is about the place racial groups should occupy in American society . . . . Despite
all the high, abstract, and moralizing rhetoric, affirmative action is about concrete matters
of who gets what.”).
311
Id. at 991.
312
See, e.g., id. at 993 (views on perceived negative effects of affirmative action); David
A. Harrison et al., Understanding Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action Programs in Employment:
Summary and Meta-Analysis of 35 Years of Research, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1013, 1021 (2006)
(results of meta-analysis of 35 years of research on affirmative action programs in employment
show that White people have least positive attitudes, Black people most positive attitudes,
and Hispanic Americans attitudes that fall somewhere in-between).
313
Bobo, supra note 310, at 993–95.
314
See, e.g., Harrison et al., supra note 312, at 1021, 1027 (“When moderation does exist,
more prescriptive AAPs (e.g., preferential treatment for those in a particular demographic
category) tend to widen the attitudinal divide across races and genders, as well as accentuate
the effects of personal self-interest, beliefs about discrimination suffered by the target group,
and racism.”).
315
Bobo, supra note 310, at 995.

2022]

HOPE DIES LAST

671

lose in terms of their position in the racial hierarchy are most likely to reject intervention, and they do so in relation to the severity of that intervention.
As a result, it should not come as a surprise that research on threats has found
a connection between the views of whites on affirmative action and threats to their
material and symbolic status as the dominant group in the racial hierarchy. Consider
the research of Renfro and colleagues, which investigated how perceptions of threat
relate to the views of whites on both affirmative action as a policy, and on the
beneficiaries of affirmative action.316 In an initial study, they found that whites’
responses to survey questions that framed affirmative action in terms of threats to
the material and symbolic/cultural interests of whites317 significantly predicted whether
study participants supported affirmative action as a policy as well as their views on
the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Specifically, perceptions of realistic threat
were strong predictors of whites rejecting affirmative action as a policy, and symbolic threats were strong predictors of negative attitudes of whites toward the
beneficiaries of affirmative action.318 These threats, moreover, mediated the significant influence of “personal relevance” (i.e., agreement with the notion that affirmative action would have detrimental effects on a participants’ own chances or of those
close to them such as family and friends) on participants’ attitudes toward affirmative action and its beneficiaries.319 A second study not only replicated these basic
results, but also showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effects of overt
racism, negative affect toward Black people, and political conservatism on opposition to affirmative action.320 In other words, consistent with the research discussed
316

C. Lausanne Renfro et al., The Role of Threat in Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action
and Its Beneficiaries, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 41, 41, 46, 51 (2006).
317
For example, realistic threat questions asked respondents to rate their agreement with
statements such as whether affirmative action leads to costly lawsuits that hurt businesses
and hostility directed at White people. Id. at 46. Symbolic threat questions asked respondents
to rate their agreement with statements such as whether affirmative action poses threats to
the cultural practices of the majority and whether beneficiaries of affirmative action have the
same work values as the majority. Id. at 47.
318
Renfro et al., supra note 316, at 50–51. In this study, the authors measured negative
stereotypes as a separate racial threat category, which was also predictive of negative attitudes
toward the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Id. Since the study, threat theorists have reconceptualized stereotypes as subcomponents of realistic or symbolic threats, depending on
whether the stereotypes at issue concern the potential for actual harm to the ingroup (in
which case they would function as realistic threats) or the potential to undermine the values
and beliefs of the ingroup (symbolic threats). See Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, supra note 271,
at 257–58. In the Renfro study, the stereotypes at issue (lazy, competent, unfriendly, resilient
(strong), unreliable, compassionate, arrogant, selfish, opportunistic, intelligent, and hardworking) are mostly value-based and thus it makes sense that they exhibited a greater influence
on White attitudes toward affirmative action beneficiaries, in conjunction with the “symbolic
threat” measure used in the study.
319
Renfro et al., supra note 316, at 51–53.
320
See id. at 62–64.
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in the previous section, perceptions of threat to the material and symbolic dominance of whites in the American racial hierarchy drives whites’ rejection of affirmative action as a policy, and their negative views of the people who benefit from it,
to a significant extent.321
Importantly, and closer to the specific point made in this Article, recent research
has convincingly suggested that a governmental program need not be explicitly or
predominantly based on race in how it distributes benefits or opportunities for racial
threats to operate and to generate white racial resentment and white opposition.
Even in non-race-based programs, racial threats and racial resentment can operate
as “complementary accounts of white Americans’ racial attitudes.”322 Consider Wetts
and Willer’s recent investigation into the sources of white support for, or opposition
to, welfare programs. Their study of welfare programs is particularly instructive
because such programs are “formally race-blind”323 and have not been put in place
with race as the “predominant factor” in determining who gets to benefit from them.
Therefore, they are not the kind of program that the antibalkanization approach
conceives of as a likely source of white racial hostility and resentment. However,
welfare programs are “perceived in racialized terms” in that racial minorities are
perceived to be the prototypical beneficiary of such programs.324 Thus, they are a
proxy for the more “diffuse” types of race-conscious but facially race-neutral racial
equality programs that some antibalkanization proponents have proposed as preferable solutions over explicitly race-based interventions.325
What Wetts and Willer found in a series of studies about the relationship between racial threat, racial resentment, and support for welfare programs illustrates all
of the pieces summarized in this Part put together: Whites care about their dominant
position in the racial hierarchy; when there is a perceived threat to this position, even
if quite diffuse, Whites respond negatively, including by showing heightened racial resentment; this response to the threat drives Whites’ negative reactions to the source of
321

A similar finding made by Social Dominance Theory researchers is that people with
higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) may be comparatively more likely to
support “stronger” types of affirmative action programs, including quota policies, than people
with a lower SDO, but only if they expect that the beneficiaries of the policy will remain on
the bottom of the hierarchy in a particular context—that is, when they do not threaten a change
in existing hierarchy. Geoffrey C. Ho & Miguel M. Unzueta, Antiegalitarians for Affirmative
Action? When Social Dominance Orientation Is Positively Related to Support for Egalitarian
Social Policies, 45 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 451, 453 (2015). The authors in this study used
a multiracial pool of participants because their focus was on the operation of SDO and not
on the specific views of Whites. However, as noted above, Whites generally have higher
levels of SDO and thus should be particularly likely to exhibit this kind of reasoning.
322
Rachel Wetts & Robb Willer, Privilege on the Precipice: Perceived Racial Status
Threats Lead White Americans to Oppose Welfare Programs, 97 SOC. FORCES 793, 797 (2018).
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
See supra Section I.D.
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the threat, including racial equality programs; this is the case even if the source of the
threat does not involve an explicit or “predominant” use of race by the government.
In their first study, Wetts and Willer investigated the relationship between
threat, resentment, and welfare support by analyzing the nationally representative
American National Election Studies surveys held in each presidential election year
from 2000 through 2012. They found that White racial resentment rose significantly
between 2004 and 2008, as well as between 2008 and 2012—which the authors
suggest is in part driven by the “increased racial status threat” of perceived rising
racial minority electoral power as represented most prominently by the candidacy
and election of Barack Obama.326 And while they did not find a significant absolute
increase in White opposition to welfare during this period, this was likely because
the onset of the 2008 financial crisis intervened, temporarily buoyed relative support
for welfare programs as often happens in times of economic crisis, and thus suppressed what would otherwise have been a significant absolute increase in White
opposition to welfare as a result of racial status threat.327 This is illustrated by the
fact that relative levels of welfare opposition between Whites and racial minorities
diverged significantly, such that minorities became more supportive of welfare as
the crisis began, Whites did not increase their absolute support for welfare as is
otherwise common in economic downturns and even marginally decreased it, and
this decrease was partially mediated by higher levels of racial resentment.328
In two follow-up experiments, Wetts and Willer provided additional evidence
for the causal relationships involved. First, they found that exposing participants to
threat via information about the majority-minority shift (discussed in depth above) led
White participants to express both significantly higher levels of racial resentment and
significantly greater opposition to welfare compared to a control group; and that the
increased racial resentment mediated the effect of status threat on welfare opposition.329
Second, the authors tested in more detail the significance of White perceptions of
who would benefit from a particular welfare program. They found that exposing
Whites to threat by presenting projections that the racial income gap was closing led
White participants to express significantly greater opposition to welfare programs, but
only if such programs were described as largely benefitting racial minorities rather
than largely benefitting Whites.330 Accordingly, Wetts and Willer concluded that
326

Wetts & Willer, supra note 322, at 802.
Id. at 804–05.
328
Id.
329
Id. at 808–10.
330
Id. at 812–14. The study design provides especially strong support for the conclusion
that it was precisely the racial composition of the welfare recipients that mattered: Each participant rated their support for two different programs (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) and unemployment insurance) of which one was described as primarily benefitting
minorities and the other was described as primarily benefitting White people. The descriptions
were then randomly varied between participants. Id. at 812.
327
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“[w]hile white Americans often engage in impression management to appear colorblind, such efforts did not overcome the effect of racial status threat on participants’
willingness to voice heightened opposition to programs that benefit minorities.”331
III. HOPE DIES LAST—REVIVING REMEDIAL RACIAL JUSTICE APPROACHES
To summarize the main insights from the above, Part I of this Article showed
how the antibalkanization approach replicates the three basic characteristics of a
perpetrator perspective of racial inequality and discrimination: (1) a baseline view
of American society as presumptively racially egalitarian; (2) a conviction that blameworthy perpetrators who interfere with this baseline are the main racial equality
problem; and (3) a resulting doctrinal focus on policing the inappropriate behaviors
of such perpetrators. Part II then reviewed social science research that challenges
attributes (1) and (2) by suggesting that the structural influence of racial hierarchy
on the interests, perceptions, and behaviors of White Americans makes it questionable to assume their commitment to a shared racial equality destination; and that
White racial hostility and resentment is a phenomenon that unfolds in response to
hierarchy threats and is not dependent on the existence of a government racial
hostility perpetrator that focuses on race “too much.” This Part now challenges attribute (3) and suggests implications for how both policymakers and the Court might
transcend the regressive reality of the antibalkanization approach and build on its
progressive potential.
Perhaps the most important general takeaway for both policymakers and the Court
is that the antibalkanization approach and the research discussed in Part II suggest
different models for the relationship between governmental race-consciousness,
social cohesion, and racial hostility and resentment on the path from a status quo of
continued racial inequality to a desired end-state that features both racial equality
and social cohesion. As illustrated in simplified form by Figure 1, the antibalkanization
approach proceeds from the underlying assumption that “social cohesion is a prerequisite for equality.”332

331

Id. at 816. As Sam Bagenstos has noted, a similar dynamic likely underwrote the immediate and stark opposition by White people to race-neutral efforts to integrate suburban
housing during the Nixon administration “precisely because racial minorities were understood
as their principal beneficiaries.” Bagenstos, supra note 279, at 2853–55.
332
Siegel, supra note 14, at 1350.
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The path to racial equality if social cohesion is a prerequisite.333
This model views social cohesion as a mechanism for achieving racial equality
progress that must logically precede the achievement of substantive equal opportunity. Racial hostility and resentment, by contrast, is viewed as a (perhaps the) major
obstacle to the achievement of substantive equal opportunity and leads to the
perpetuation of the unequal status quo instead. The impact of governmental raceconsciousness on racial equality progress in this model is tied to the bias cascade.
If the use of race is such that it cuts off or avoids the full course of the cascade (i.e.,
the government is not a racial hostility perpetrator), it is consistent with enabling
social cohesion and thus supportive of racial equality progress. Such uses of race are
compatible with the existing but fragile commitment of White Americans to a
racially egalitarian society. But if the use of race is “too much” such that it allows
the bias cascade to run its full course (i.e., the government is a racial hostility
perpetrator), it subverts this commitment, destroys social cohesion, and thus prevents racial equality progress.
As illustrated by Figure 2 and based on the research described in Part II, a
hierarchy-aware approach suggests instead that both social cohesion and racial
hostility and resentment may be better thought of as effects of different stages of the
racial equality process rather than as mechanism and obstacle, respectively.

333

Figures created by the author for use in this Article. Copyright David Simson 2021.
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The path to equality if structural conditions of racial hierarchy, or hierarchy
aware approach, is assumed.334
In this model, both racial hostility and resentment and social cohesion are still
important components, but the primary drivers of the model are the structural
conditions of racial hierarchy.335 As even antibalkanization proponents acknowledge, the current status quo of American race relations is characterized by racial
hierarchy: “The enduring hope is that race should not matter” but “the reality is that
too often it does.”336 Achievement of the end-goal of substantive equal opportunity
will thus require reducing the extent of this hierarchy.337 And as Part II suggests,
because the self-understanding and interests of White Americans as a group are
significantly tied to their dominant group position in this hierarchy, they will perceive such reductions as a threat and react with racial hostility and resentment.338
334

Id.
This focus on structural conditions is consistent with calls by CRT scholars for replacing
a perpetrator perspective with a victim perspective. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 33, at
1053 (“The victim, or ‘condition,’ conception of racial discrimination suggests that the problem
will not be solved until the conditions associated with it have been eliminated.”).
336
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
337
This is quasi-definitional. If substantive equal opportunity means “a society where race
is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement,” Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 505–06 (1989), and racial hierarchy means that members of some racial groups,
i.e., Whites, predictably have access to greater opportunity and achievement, see Ansley,
supra note 256, then progress toward substantive equal opportunity requires reducing (and
eventually eliminating) racial hierarchy.
338
See also Wetts & Willer, supra note 322, at 818 (“Because status rank is hierarchical
and zero-sum, any increases in economic or political power of lower-status groups can be
335
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Racial hostility and resentment is thus an essentially inevitable short-term side effect
of racial equality progress, not an obstacle to it.
In a hierarchy-aware model, social cohesion may or may not be conducive to
racial equality progress. As social science research on the “irony of harmony”339
shows, under conditions of group inequality, advantaged and disadvantaged groups
are more likely to interact harmoniously when they focus on commonalities between
them, such as a shared “common identity” (e.g., “American”).340 Such harmonious
commonality-based interactions can, in turn, improve the attitudes of advantaged
and disadvantaged groups toward each other. However, they may simultaneously
reduce both groups’ perception of how much inequality and discrimination against
the disadvantaged group actually exists, and thus reduce each group’s motivation
to change the unequal status quo.341 In other words, if it results from not confronting
intergroup inequality, intergroup harmony may exist, but only as “a hollow and potentially unstable form of harmony.”342 The development of productive and lasting
social cohesion, by contrast, likely requires first addressing unequal power relations
and changing the conditions of structural inequality, along with the short-term
tension that will accompany this process.343
Accordingly, in a hierarchy-aware model, the impact of governmental raceconsciousness on racial equality progress is tied to whether it facilitates or obstructs
structural change to the racial hierarchy, not to whether it involves a racial hostility
perpetrator. Race-consciousness that reduces the conditions of racial hierarchy (e.g.,
significant disparities in important life outcomes) is supportive of racial equality progress even if it leads to racial hostility and resentment because it threatens the hierarchy
interests of White Americans.344 On the other hand, limiting race-consciousness to
interpreted as a threat to the relative standing of dominant group members. Thus, any progress
toward equality may provoke resentment on the part of dominant group members.”).
339
Tamar Saguy et al., The Irony of Harmony: Intergroup Contact Can Produce False
Expectations for Equality, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 114 (2009).
340
Advantaged groups prefer for interactions with disadvantaged groups to be based on
such a single common identity in part because this commonality focus sidesteps within-group
differences, “typically reflects the characteristics, norms, and values of the majority group,”
and allows to “distract[] attention away from the advantages enjoyed by the majority group.”
John F. Dovidio et al., Included but Invisible? Subtle Bias, Common Identity, and the Darker
Side of “We,” 10 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 6, 17 (2016).
341
See, e.g., Tamar Saguy, Downside of Intergroup Harmony? When Reconciliation Might
Backfire and What to Do, 5 POL’Y INSIGHTS BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 75, 76–78 (2018)
(summarizing research); Dovidio et al., supra note 340, at 16–26.
342
Dovidio et al., supra note 340, at 31.
343
See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, Tamar Saguy & Nurit Shnabel, Cooperation and Conflict
within Groups: Bridging Intragroup and Intergroup Processes, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 429, 438
(2009) (noting that “conflict can . . . represent a healthy developmental stage on the societal
or group level”).
344
Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 36 (“If the Supreme Court truly believes that its doctrines should promote social cohesion, then it should vigorously utilize the Equal Protection
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only those forms that are unlikely to lead to White racial hostility and resentment,
while possibly leading to hollow social cohesion, would permit only those interventions that interfere minimally with the hierarchy and would thus broadly perpetuate
the status quo. This latter approach closely resembles the antibalkanization approach
as currently practiced by the Court.
What are the implications for policymakers and the Court? For policymakers with
stated racial justice commitments such as the Biden administration, the most important implication is that if they are serious about “root[ing] out systemic racism,”345
they will need to fully commit to pursuing decisive structural intervention even if
their efforts are likely to conflict to some extent with a desire to “unify,” “lower the
temperature,” and find “time to heal.”346 Doing so will require a break from much
of past practice. In this context, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court
is not the only relevant actor that has embraced a perpetrator-perspective-based
antibalkanization approach to racial equality progress over the last few decades. As
Derrick Bell has pointed out, prioritizing White harmony over structural racial
change is a recurring phenomenon throughout American history.347 Similarly, as Ian
Haney López has shown, such an approach has also guided the views of liberal pundits and high-level decisionmakers in the Democratic Party establishment since at
least the early 1990s and through the Obama administration.348
What will be required instead is a conviction that “ameliorating racial inequality
is a precondition to ending racial politics” and that “[c]orrecting gross racial inequalities is necessary to make good on our social obligation to get beyond racism.”349
Such a conviction will be critical because it is eminently predictable that many of
Biden’s proposed racial justice initiatives will trigger strong reactions as a result of
the dynamics described in this Article. Take as one example Biden’s charge to
forcefully implement the Fair Housing Act’s mandate to affirmatively further fair
housing by taking “actions that undo historic patterns of segregation and other types
of discrimination and that afford access to long-denied opportunities.”350 As Blake
Clause to help eradicate group-based inequities; these inequities cause more social division
than diversity alone.”).
345
See Phillips, supra note 5.
346
See Phillips, supra note 5.
347
Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 61, at 372; Bell, supra note 11.
348
See supra note 8; see also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 3, at 228 (“Already we see some
leading liberals suggesting that Democrats must continue to ‘moderate[] their economic and
social message,’ the better to avoid rekindling the ‘widespread popular disgust with the extremes to which liberal Democrats and New Left movements had gone in the late sixties and
the seventies.’ Arguments like these merely reinvigorate the advice Democratic pundits have
been offering since the 1970s: flee from race and flee from liberalism and the middle class too.”)
(quoting JOHN JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 3 (2002)).
349
HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 3, at 221 (emphasis omitted).
350
See Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s History
of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2021),
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Emerson has analyzed in detail, if implemented forcefully, this rule has the potential
to support deep structural changes to the many aspects of policymaking that have
historically created residential segregation and racial inequality tied to housing.351
A big part of the reason is that the rule forces an explicitly race-conscious engagement with structural racial inequality in housing and empowers the victims of racial
discrimination to have a voice in a process that aims for transformative and racially
equitable solutions.352 But precisely for this reason, given the deep and multifaceted
ways in which housing discrimination is connected to racial hierarchy,353 it will trigger
the same “immense social confrontation” that issues of housing integration have long
triggered historically.354 Policymakers in the past have pulled back in response to such
hostility and resentment—and widespread housing segregation continues as a result.355
For things to be different this time, the Biden administration would need to
supercharge the progressive potential of the antibalkanization approach. It would
need to go beyond exhibiting a basic willingness to learn about the realities of race
and to support a bit more race-consciousness over time. It would also need to replace the approach’s perpetrator perspective with a structural view of racial inequality. The current antibalkanization approach would view White racial hostility and
resentment resulting from changes to the racial hierarchy of housing as counterproductive to long-term equality progress, and as the result of the government moving
too fast or “too much” toward racial equality. It would slow down interventions in
response. A hierarchy-aware approach, by contrast, would understand based on both
historical evidence356 and social science research357 that this hostility and resentment
is a response to hierarchy threat which realistically cannot be avoided on the path
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum
-on-redressing-our-nations-and-the-federal-governments-history-of-discriminatory-housing
-practices-and-policies/ [https://perma.cc/PE84-2NTP].
351
See Emerson, supra note 15, at 204 (“The issues HUD asks . . . participants to consider
. . . and open up for public discussion, cover a vast terrain of local policy issues, from zoning
regulation, to the placement of schools, to access to public services.”); see also id. at 174–78,
203–07.
352
Id. at 188, 203–04 (noting that the rule calls for input from “the public, including individuals historically excluded because of characteristics protected by the Fair Housing Act,”
and aims to “empower program participants and to foster diversity and strength of community
by overcoming historic patterns of segregation, reducing racial or ethnic concentrations of
poverty, and responding to identified disproportionate housing needs”).
353
See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Emerson, supra note 15, at 167 (“Housing
policy lies at the foundation of the racial hierarchies that permeate society, determining
access to employment, education, and wealth.”).
354
Emerson, supra note 15, at 204.
355
See generally CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS (2006).
356
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 279, at 2853–55.
357
See Ryan D. Enos, What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us about the Impact
of Racial Threat on Political Behavior, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 123–24 (2016).
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toward meaningful racial equality. It would also recognize that this hostility and
resentment analytically need not be avoided even if lasting social cohesion is part
of the long-term goal. In other words, if the administration’s goal is truly to “root
out systemic racism,” it would need to commit to sustained and vigorous policy
implementation even if this was incompatible with “lower[ing] the temperature” in
the short term.
With respect to the Court, the analysis in this Article suggests the need for a shift
in the Court’s understanding of the role of judicial review in the antibalkanization approach’s core territory. As illustrated in Figure 3, the Court’s current approach views
the role of judicial review as that of policing governmental racial hostility perpetrators.

The Court’s remedial approach focuses on specific government actors rather
than societal discrimination.358
As part of this role-understanding, the Court has particularly severely cabined
the discretion of government actors to rely on race in pursuit of remedial goals. For
fear that broader programs cause counterproductive racial hostility and resentment, the
Court allows only those programs that precisely remedy identified discrimination
by a specific government actor, but not those that respond to “societal discrimination.”359 Such an approach is understandably tempting. It promotes the Court to the
elevated position of protecting racial equality progress from the misguided actions
of representative government—a position the Court has claimed for itself since at
least Brown v. Board of Education.360
However, it also ignores the reality of American racial dynamics. As illustrated
in Figure 4, a hierarchy-aware approach would recognize that to facilitate achieving
358
359
360

Simson, supra note 333.
See supra Sections I.D and F.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the goal of substantive equal opportunity, legal doctrine and judicial review need to
support, or at a minimum not undermine, structural changes to the conditions of
racial hierarchy.

A hierarchy-aware approach employs judicial review to support structural
conditions of racial hierarchy.361
This, in turn, has very different implications for remedial race-conscious equality
interventions, in particular those pursuing an interest in remedying “societal discrimination.” From a structural standpoint, remedying societal discrimination is an
especially compelling interest. Properly understood, societal discrimination refers
to the multiple ways in which people and institutions instantiate racial hierarchy in
their daily interactions across the many domains of social life. It is evidenced by
significant racial disparities in life outcomes, which in turn are inextricably connected to disparities in access to opportunity.362 Thus, in a hierarchy-aware model,
government actors who choose to reduce such disparities in their sphere of influence
through race-conscious means should have significant discretion in how to go about
doing so, regardless of whether there is evidence of prior “identified discrimination”
by themselves.
The antibalkanization approach objects to such discretion because it believes
that absent proof of identified discrimination (1) such remedies necessarily involve
improper governmental stereotyping about the causal role of race (as opposed to,
361

Simson, supra note 333.
For examples of the inextricably interconnected nature of racial disparities and equal
opportunity in the context of housing, economic opportunity, and democratic participation,
see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 64, at 1199–1207.
362
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say, choice363) in creating the disparities;364 and (2) such stereotyping then starts the
bias cascade and obstructs racial equality progress by causing counterproductive
racial hostility and resentment.365
But both beliefs are flawed. Regarding (2), as noted above, the hostility and
resentment that is generated by programs that remedy societal discrimination is
better understood not as the product of governmental stereotyping and the bias
cascade it initiates, but as an essentially inevitable side effect of the fact that such
programs represent the ultimate threat to racial hierarchy and thus will be resisted
by those with an interest in protecting their dominant position in it.366 Regarding (1),
as Noah Zatz has suggested, significant racial disparities in life outcomes are causally
related to race to some extent—when such disparities exist and a distributive decisionmaking process ignores them, some members of the disadvantaged group lose out
on opportunities simply because of their race.367 This does not mean that all members of the disadvantaged group necessarily do so,368 nor that the specific governmental actor whose distributive decisions are at issue is necessarily responsible for
creating this injury.369 But it does mean that significant disparities reliably indicate
the presence of a race-based injury for which a race-conscious remedy is the most
appropriate and effective response.370 Contra the antibalkanization approach, the fact
that the government actor who has an opportunity to remedy the disparity is not responsible for its existence does not minimize the propriety of the remedy.371 “To hold
otherwise is like holding that a victim of a knife wound may not receive surgical
treatment, except at the hands of the assailant.”372
At a very minimum, this Article’s analysis shows that the accuracy and implications of these contested assumptions are subject to what Rick Hills has called
“reasonable and deep disagreement” (RADD).373 As Hills suggests, in a federalist
363
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Id. at 1262.
373
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Baseline Disputes in the Law of Religious Liberty, 69 ALA. L. REV. 913, 916 (2018).
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system like the United States, one resolution to such a RADD that shows “equal
concern and respect” for the contending sides is not to impose a broad national resolution of the contested question—like the Supreme Court has done by constitutionalizing its strict limits on race-consciousness—but instead to “devolve the choice”
between available reasonable alternatives “to subnational governments.”374 Such an
approach would involve a more deferential constitutional review standard that would
allow different state actors to make different reasonable baseline assumptions, including the hierarchy-aware assumptions outlined above, about the causes of persistent
racial inequality and the need for race-conscious responses to address them.375 State
actors would not be mandated to make and act upon hierarchy-aware assumptions.376
But they would be permitted to do so and to thereby show “equal concern and
respect” for the views of those who believe that a purely perpetrator-based approach
to solving racial inequality is bound to fail and that a victim-based approach ought to
be implemented.377 As Hills notes, a decentralizing approach to constitutional RADDs
such as that over the sources of, and solutions to, persistent racial inequality may
actually be a more likely “basis for social peace and civil discourse” than a one-sizefits-all solution imposed by the Court,378 even setting aside the Court’s mistaken
factual assumptions about the social dynamics of racial equality discussed above.
374
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These considerations suggest that the objections by antibalkanization Justices
that loosening the strictures imposed on remedial programs would force the judiciary to adjudicate “inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs”379 and create
constantly shifting “judicial rankings” of who is entitled to preferential consideration (which “does not lie within the judicial competence”380) are a red herring in the
core territory of the approach. This territory does not involve issues in which the
judiciary mandates that other government actors use race to remedy societal discrimination in a particular way.381 Rather, “questions of constitutional permission
predominate.”382 In this context, the question for judicial review is whether the
government has acted within the level of discretion that the nature of its activity
entitles it to. Once one accepts the view that more discretion is appropriate, whether
based explicitly on the persuasiveness of a structural view of racial inequality or
based on a preference for decentralization of deep disagreements under Hills’s
approach,383 the task of judicial review ceases to involve the treacherous enforcement of a highly precise boundary line.384 Instead, it becomes more one of keeping
governmental actors inside a band of possibilities within which these difficult choices
can be made through negotiation by the affected groups themselves.385 The judiciary’s lack of confidence in its own ability to make such choices should not prevent
other actors from voluntarily protecting racial equality rights more strongly.386
Moreover, to the extent that remedial programs face difficult political obstacles due
to the very racial hierarchy interests of Whites in what remains a majority-White
nation,387 the fear that permitting greater discretion for such programs would lead
to a “mosaic of shifting preferences”388 for “almost any . . . racial group with the
political strength to negotiate ‘a piece of the action’”389 seems overblown.
With more discretion at their disposal, government actors who set out to remedy
societal discrimination could act as the kind of “laboratories for experimentation to
379
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devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear” that antibalkanization proponents have endorsed when such actors restrict race-conscious government
action.390 As such laboratories, willing government actors could then more fully
address the antibalkanization approach’s valid concerns about stereotyping, stigma,
racial politics, division, and racial hostility and resentment. With respect to stereotyping, for example, research shows that reducing under-representation and segregation is often necessary to successfully counteract stereotypes.391 Similarly, while
there is no easy way to avoid racial division, there are good reasons to think that
more race-conscious engagement, not less, would help make people less susceptible
to the power of divisive racial appeals over time.392 Such “policy innovations” should
be given an opportunity to prove their potential for success and to perhaps even
become “contagious.”393
Importantly, working toward a more structural form of racial equality would
also benefit White Americans in deep and important ways. As Angela OnwuachiWillig has argued, our legal system’s approach to racial equality has always ignored
that racial discrimination and a racial hierarchy grounded in White supremacy do not
just harm people of color, but Whites as well.394 They have a dehumanizing effect on
Whites by creating a false sense of racial superiority that underwrites a feeling of
entitlement to racial privilege and justifies the mistreatment and neglect of those
viewed as racially inferior.395 This sense of superiority “is particularly dangerous to
a society that seeks racial equality” because it justifies a zero-sum view of racial
equality based on which Whites feel “deprived of the material benefits and privileges
that their ancestors had when Blacks were denied all privileges and rights by law.”396
390
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Thus, building a more lasting form of social cohesion and solidarity will require
challenging this sense of superiority by working to dismantle “the very structures
and institutions that work to perpetuate racial inequality.”397
The urgency of the need for such a transformation in the Court’s approach is
clear. The powerful social movement activity of groups like Black Lives Matter in
response to the many racial tragedies that continue to haunt American society is
succeeding at least in some places to shift the conversation from a focus on individual perpetrators to structural injustice. Based on the regressive current version of the
antibalkanization approach, however, constitutional law is much more likely to deter
or undermine any policy victories that might be won by such activism than to
support them.398 The analysis in this Article suggests that this is not inevitable, even
if the concerns raised by the antibalkanization approach are taken seriously. But it
will take an adjustment to the Court’s basic assumptions about the nature of American race relations for things to change. If, but only if, a majority of the Court is
willing to honestly question its baseline assumptions could the Court help turn the
small progressive potential of the last few decades of its racial equality jurisprudence into progressive reality.
Given the recent changes in the composition of the Court, of course, it seems
highly unlikely that the Court will actually do so in the near term. It is difficult to
know whether there remain members in the conservative majority on the Court that
may be willing to continue to apply even the “traditional” antibalkanization approach with all of its flaws. While long-standing efforts to put predictable partisans
onto the Supreme Court have not fully succeeded in eliminating swing votes on the
Court in cases with social justice dimensions,399 there are no clear indications that
racial justice is a clear priority for occasional swing voters. Perhaps the best that one
could expect, then, is that a combination of Justices who are comparatively willing to
follow precedent and/or who are somewhat willing to learn and challenge their priors
on race will vote to preserve the fragile status quo that permits some governmental
397
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race-consciousness in higher education and redistricting as new challenges to these
practices return to the Court.
If, as is perhaps more likely, the Court will pull back on race-consciousness
instead, this Article hopes to have made at least a small contribution to the project
of holding the Court accountable for its choices and planting the seeds for a more
transformative jurisprudence in the future. In the hopes that over the long term the
Court might become more receptive to rigorous analyses of complex and often ugly
racial dynamics, it will be critical to have laid the groundwork. History provides
many reasons to be pessimistic about the likelihood of such a future. But hope dies
last, after all.
CONCLUSION
Recognition of the antibalkanization approach to equal protection has improved
our understanding of the Supreme Court’s racial equality jurisprudence of the last
four decades. Driven by the views of a small number of Justices in the middle of the
Court, questions of “balkanization,” and in particular of social cohesion and racial
hostility and resentment, have taken center stage. Antibalkanization Justices have
developed a consistent jurisprudence around these questions and have based it on
relevant racial equality concerns. But they have developed this jurisprudence from
within a world that, while plausible, does not reflect the actual world of race relations in the United States. Their jurisprudence remains trapped in a perpetrator perspective that overlooks the crucial structural influence of racial hierarchy and White
supremacy. Programs that aim to remedy the continuing effects of this hierarchy
have been the approach’s primary victims. A more transformative jurisprudence
requires incorporating a more realistic understanding of American race relations into
legal doctrine and policymaking. A willingness to take these steps in the near future
seems elusive and unlikely. But hope gains strength from the collective efforts of
those demanding a more just future. And hope dies last. We shall see where it will
be able to take us.

